

In Search of a Boundless Ocean and New Skies: Human Creativity is a Matter of A‘māl, Jihad, and Ijtihad

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The stars tremble in their courses over man’s upward march lest this fallen star should become the perfect moon!¹

The central question this article addresses is whether human beings can act creatively. I shall first tackle the related question of how God’s creativity is distinguished from that of humanity and then move on to the more complex question of the nature of human creativity.

God’s Creativity is Different from That of Humankind

The Qur’an relates *rabb* (lord) to *khalq* (creation):

He said: “Our Lord [*rabb*] is He who gives to everything its . . . [*khalq*] . . . and further gave (it) guidance. (Qur’an 20:50)²

The noun *khalq* is considered by lexicographers to be derived from the root verb *khalaqa* (to create, to make, to originate).³ And if God (*al Khāliq*) created or originated, then *khalaqa* is a verb that signifies His creative ability. According to al Rāghib, *khalq* is used to describe the creativity (*ibdā’*) of a thing without imitation (*ikhtizā’*).⁴ He assigns this role of *khalq* to God (*al Khāliq*).⁵ For al Ṭabaṭabā’ī “the God of the universe is one, He alone created and He alone manages it.”⁶ In fact, the link between God as *rabb* and *khalq* is accentuated by al Ṭabaṭabā’ī, who considers *rabb* to be “the owner to whom the creation . . . belongs.”⁷ Moreover, this mean-

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ing of *khalq* is clarified in terms of *ibdā'*, which is derived from *abda'a* (to originate, to innovate, to bring into existence without the "similitude of anything pre-existing),"⁸ which, according to al Raghīb, means without imitation.⁹ What follows from this is that God's (creation) is recognized by creativity, which is averse to imitation.

Qur'an 2:185 claims that guidance (*hudā*) has been given to humanity (*al nās*), the plural form of *al insān*.¹⁰ Now, if one considers that the knowledge of God is creative, then humanity is the recipient of creative guidance. Does it follow necessarily from this that human beings have to be creative? To answer this question, I shall look briefly at humanity's nature, purpose, and relationship with the universe.

Humanity has accepted the *amānah* (trust) that was rejected by other creations of God:

We did indeed offer the Trust to the heavens and the earth and the mountains. But they refused to undertake it, being afraid thereof. But man undertook it. (Qur'an 33:72)

In this verse, *trust* refers to the volition and intellect (*'aql*) of humanity,¹¹ both of which the individual uses to make sense of God's guidance. Of course, scholars have interpreted *amānah* in various ways. Abdullah refers to it as the commandments of Allah. However, such an explanation is implausible because everything in the heavens and the Earth functions according to the "commandments of Allah,"¹² whereas the verse states specifically that the heavens and the Earth refused to accept the *amānah*. Now, the application of volition and intellect implies, necessarily, that humanity's interpretation of the guidance of the Qur'an has to be innovative and creative. *Intellect* refers to the ability to understand, reason, and learn to adapt to new situations¹³—in other words, to be creative, imaginative, and innovative. Also, drawing on Abdullah,

'aql is considered as the suitable tool for understanding revealed knowledge and acquiring new forms of it through reflection on Allah's signs in the self, the history of past generations and the universe.¹⁴

In his *al Mizān fī Tafṣīr al Qur'ān*, al Ṭabaṭabā'ī also depicts *'aql* as denoting "comprehension and understanding . . . by which man differentiates between good and bad, distinguishes fact from fiction, and discerns truth and falsehood."¹⁵ For him, *'aql* is that "which benefits a man in his religion, and leads him to true knowledge and virtuous deeds,"¹⁶ as opposed to "idiocy, foolishness and ignorance."¹⁷ He argues that the very foundation of human life ought to be constituted by *'aql*, namely, "correct perception and proper thinking, in all its affairs."¹⁸ Hence, because the use of *'aql* is central to human practices and it also underpins creative human activity, humanity has the capacity to be creative.

Moreover, regarding the creation of human beings, it is stated that:

When I have fashioned him (in due proportion) and breathed into him My spirit [*rūḥ*], fall ye down in obeisance unto him.²² (Qur'an 15:29)

The creation of humanity's physical form has been superseded by the fact that God endowed each individual with a *rūḥ* (soul or consciousness).¹⁹ And, because God, in His capacity as the Creator, "created man in the best of moulds"²⁰ and endowed each individual with a soul, the very nature of the soul is potentially creative. In support of this, Iqbal claims "that the essential nature of the soul is directive (or creative), as it proceeds from the directive energy of God."²¹

In addition, if the nature of humanity is inherently creative, its purpose on Earth is to bring out that latent creativity. In other words, each individual should pursue actively his/her capacity for innovative action. In support of this claim, the Qur'an states:

It is He [God] who hath made you (His) agents, inheritors of the earth: He has raised you in ranks, some above others that He may try you in the gifts He has given you. (Qur'an 6:165)

The term *khalā'if al arḍ* is the plural form of *khalīfat al arḍ*, which denotes one who has gained possession of (inherited) the Earth and acts according to God's guidance.²² And, if one acts according to God's creative guidance, then one's very actions should be creative. In fact, Abdullah claims the concept of *khalīfah* also refers to one who "emancipates" himself/herself from all kinds of "slavery."²³ Now, if one considers that "slavery" is a term that depicts the lack of "independence" of thought and "individuality"²⁴ experienced by dominated individuals, then Muslims (in accordance with this idea of *khalīfah*) have to wean themselves from dependency, defined as that which confines and hampers innovative and creative thinking.

Furthermore, the relationship between human beings and the universe also demands that human beings be creative. Why? The Qur'anic idea of the universe and the relationship that ought to exist between it and human beings is explained as follows:

It is God who hath created the heavens and the earth and sendeth down rain from the skies, and with it bringeth out fruits wherewith to feed you; it is He who hath made the ships subject to you that they may sail through the sea by His Command; and the rivers has He made subject to you. And He has made subject to you the sun and the moon both diligently pursuing their courses; and the Night and the Day hath He (also) made subject to you. (Qur'an 14:32-33)

What follows from the above is that the entire universe and its contents were made to be explored by humanity. Now, if one considers that the universe and its contents function according to His command, then their operation is creative. In this regard, the Qur'an claims that God "adds to Creation as He pleases,"²⁵ which means that creation by God is a creative act, referred to by Iqbal as "a growing Universe, capable of increase and extension."²⁶ And, if the universe and its contents are to be explored by humanity, creativity cannot be denied from their actions. In support of this, Iqbal claims that

this Universe . . . which is an open, unfinished entity, constantly undergoing increase and extension (i.e., being creative), provides a stimulating field for man's free and creative activity through which, on the one hand, he conquers the world of Nature and, on the other, brings to perfection the latent powers of his own individuality.²⁷

Moreover, al Rāzī contends that the verb *khalāqa*, from which *khalq* is derived, is related to God's knowledge ('ilm).²⁸ This makes sense, if one considers that God knows how to create (i.e., that He has 'ilm) His creations. Ibn Kathīr emphasizes the fact that God alone is the Creator (*al Khāliq*) to whom all creativity belongs.²⁹ Consequently, human practices have to be constituted by *khalq* (a concept that incorporates *ibdā'* [creativity]), for the reason that God's knowledge (the source of human practices) is linked to *khalq*. Moreover, in a hadith narrated by Abū Hurayrah, the Prophet is reported to have related the concept of *khalq* to God's knowledge.³⁰ Hence, because God's knowledge constitutes the major source of human practices and, in turn, this knowledge is linked to *khalq* (as *ibdā'*), the latter (in the form of *ibdā'*) can be linked to human practices.

Bearing in mind that human practices are constituted by *khalq*, it would appear as if the creativity of human beings, as in the case of God, is also perfect. This is certainly not the case. The fact that humanity was created by God and therefore has the status of *makhlūq* (created),³¹ implies, necessarily, that a distinction exists between the creativity of God (the *Aḥsan al Khāliqīn* [the Best of Creators]³²) and that of a created (*makhlūq*) human being.

In essence, all knowledge comes from God, and human beings are the recipients of His knowledge. Consequently, a link exists between God's role as Creator and human beings' status as created. This makes sense if one considers Abdullah's explication of the status of "God's *khalīfah*." Drawing on the ideas of al Rāzī, al Ṭabarī, al Ṭabaṭabā'ī and al Qurṭubī, he sees a link between God and human beings and argues that *khalīfah* refers to human beings who behave and act according to God's guidance.³³ And, considering the fact that creativity constitutes God's guidance, "creative activity" (in order to understand His guidance) cannot be precluded from human practices. In support of this, Iqbal asserts

cogently that if creativity were denied to human beings, they “could not attach any meaning to the word *creation* which has a meaning for . . . [them] only in the context of . . . [their] capacity for [initiative and] original action.”³⁴ However, the creativity of human beings is not perfect, but rather that of *a‘māl* (effort), *jihad* (striving), and *ijtihad* (intellectual exertion).

***A‘māl*, Jihad, and Ijtihad: Creative Human Practices**

I alluded to the fact that only God’s knowledge is complete. By implication, creativity (*ibdā‘*) and God’s knowledge thereof are perfect. However, this does not imply that *creativity*, as articulated by human beings, is (and can ever be) perfect. This is because human knowledge, according to Qur’an 17:85, is “only a little” or, in other words, limited. I shall show later on that such actions as *fahm* (understanding), *fiqh* (knowledge), and *fikr* (thinking) are used exclusively by individuals who are being creative and are not attributed to God alone who, for example, does not think or presume,³⁵ as the Creator and when He “orders.” In fact, Ibn Kathīr regards God’s creation (*makhlūq*) as distinctly different from His role as Creator (*al Khāliq*).⁴³ This claim also finds support in a hadith:

When a religious man is asked, “Who is the most learned person,” it is better for him to attribute or entrust absolute knowledge to Allah and to say, “Allah is the most learned than anybody else.”³⁷

What are the creative practices through which human actions can be shaped? First of all:

And obey God and His Apostle. And God is well-acquainted with all that ye do [i.e., *a‘māl* or actions]. (Qur’an 58:13)

In this particular verse, reference is made to humanity’s practices (*a‘māl* or actions³⁸) in conforming to the Qur’an and Sunnah. What follows from this is that human beings practice and develop their actions through *a‘māl*. Anas narrates a hadith, according to which the Prophet said:

He who goes forth in search (to do *a‘māl*) of Allah’s knowledge is in Allah’s path till he returns.³⁹

Hence, *a‘māl* is a creative practice. Moreover, human actions desired by God articulate *ḥaqq* (truth):

That is indeed the *truth* from thy Lord. And God is not unmindful of what ye do (*ta‘malūn*) [my emphasis]. (Qur’an 2:149)

In fact, in *Ṣaḥīḥ al Bukhārī*, a hadith is narrated that describes the *ahl al 'ilm* (the learned men, namely, those who pursue creative practices) as people who do *a'māl* as a means to articulate truth:

A group of my followers will remain victorious in their struggle in the cause of *Truth*. Those are the [*ahl al 'ilm*] (my emphasis).⁴⁰

Regarding the relation between *a'māl* and *'adl* (justice), it is stated:

Be *just*: that is next to piety: And fear God. For God is well-acquainted with all that *ye do* [my emphasis]. (Qur'an 5:8)

What follows from the aforementioned is that desirous human actions articulate truth and justice. This link between human actions, truth, and justice is supported by al-Attas, for whom justice is related to order.⁴¹ In his words, "justice means a harmonious [orderly] condition . . . whereby everything [such as a human practice] is in its right and proper place."⁴² By implication, creative human action articulates justice. Hence, desirous human actions include creative human practices in the pursuit of truth, justice, and creativity.

Second, during the period when Muslims were still in Makkah (prior to their emigration to Madinah), the Qur'an constantly exhorted them to make a tremendous effort to disseminate and to implement the Qur'anic guidance (*hudā*) in their practices. In other words, they were urged by the Prophet to perform jihad:

And who does more wrong than he who invents a lie against God or rejects the *Truth* when it reaches him? . . . And those who strive in our cause [*jahadu*, the plural of *jahada* from which *jihad* is derived], we will certainly *guide* them to our paths . . . [my emphasis]. (Qur'an 29:68-69 [a Makkan revelation])

Why is jihad not related exclusively to war or fighting? I contend that jihad is synonymous with a creative practice of knowledge acquisition and articulation. According to al Rāghib, jihad means the exertion of one's ability, which is of three kinds: to strive against a visible enemy, to repel the devil, and to struggle against oneself.⁴³ Moreover, Lane defines *jihad* as "the using or exerting of one's utmost power, efforts, endeavours or ability, in contending with an object of disapprobation."⁴⁴

However, al Rāghib also depicts jihad as a practice that "articulates an idea (*rā'i*) or concept (*fikr*)."⁴⁵ Hence, this word cannot be used exclusively for war or fighting. In my view, jihad is also an educative practice to develop, through tremendous effort, the notion of Islamic education. In al Burūsīy's *Tafsīr Rūḥ al Bayān*, under a discussion of God's *amr* and *khalq*, he asserts that an understanding of God's knowledge (*ma'rifat Allāh*) only becomes transparent through jihad, here defined as constant intellectual striving.⁴⁶

Why is jihad a necessary human practice? The Qur'an, in 29:68-69 and 22:78, establishes a link between jihad and truth. In addition, al Burūsīy accentuates the importance of jihad in attaining *yaqīn* (certainty) and *darajāt al yaqīn* (degrees of certainty).⁴⁷ And, if one considers that certainty is linked to truth,⁴⁸ it can be said that jihad is constituted by truth. In his *al Mizān*, al Ṭabaṭabā'ī uses jihad to mean "reviving the truth."⁴⁹ In *Sunan Abī Dāwūd*, 'Imrān ibn Ḥusayn reported that the Prophet said: "A section of my community will continue to fight for the . . . [*haqq* or truth]."⁵⁰

Moreover, the practice of jihad is also designed to articulate justice:

And those who strive (jihad) in Our cause, we will certainly guide them to our paths: for verily God is with those who do right (a synonym for justice [*ʿadl*]⁵¹). (Qur'an 29:69)

Considering that jihad is pursued to attain truth and justice and that both truth and justice are attained through creative human actions, jihad is also a creative human practice.

Third, Qur'an 4:83 assigns the practice of *ijtihād* (defined by Lane as "exerting the faculties of the mind to the utmost"⁵²) to the *ūlū al amr*, namely, the prophets or the individuals who possess *ʿilm* (knowledge) as stated in chapter 3:

When there comes to them some matter . . . they divulge it. If they had only referred it to the Apostle, or to those charged with authority (*ūlū al amr*) among them, the proper investigators (*yastanbitūn*) would have tested it . . . [my emphasis].

In *Tāj al Arūs*, al Ḥusaynī describes *yastanbitūn* as "those individuals who search out for the meaning of something by means of *ijtihād* (intellectual exertion). In fact, Asad describes such individuals as those "engaged in obtaining intelligence,"⁵³ namely, the *mujtahidūn* (those who practice *ijtihād*). In this way, the Qur'an supports the idea that *ijtihād* is a practice designed to uncover the meanings of God's guidance. This understanding also finds support in the ideas of Daud, for whom "every epistemological endeavour is . . . an *ijtihād*."⁵⁴

In addition, the famous hadith dealing with Mu'adh ibn Jabal, the Prophet's appointed governor of Yaman (a province in Arabia), vindicates the importance of *ijtihād* as a human practice. In this hadith, the Prophet praised his governor's response that, in the absence of evidence from the Qur'an and Sunnah, he would do his utmost to form his own judgment (*ajtahidu*, from which *ijtihād* is derived).⁵⁵ This hadith illustrates an important facet of the Companions' understanding of both the Qur'anic guidance and the Sunnah: The fact that Mu'adh used "his own judgment" based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah leads to the natural conclusion that he interpreted the revealed sources of knowledge. In this

way, *ijtihād* recognizes the need for flexibility in the interpretation of what is found in these two sources. This claim is supported by Rahman, who posits that Qur'anic interpretation and understanding cannot be "absolutely monolithic."⁵⁶ He substantiates the importance of flexibility by referring to reports that the Companions had different understandings of Qur'anic verses, which means that an insistence on "absolute uniformity and interpretation is therefore neither possible nor desirable."⁵⁷ In reality, such different and varied understandings create space for flexibility and show that a certain interpretation, once accepted, is not impervious to change. Abdullah also claims that an "exact [absolute] translation of the Qur'anic text is considered to be out of the question,"⁵⁸ for one can translate its meaning but not the Qur'an itself.⁵⁹ Such a view allows for greater flexibility in the quest to understand the meaning of the Qur'an.

In essence, *ijtihād* is a creative human practice that provides for flexibility in understanding the revealed and "nonrevealed" sources of knowledge. Moreover, because *ijtihād* is a human practice, human actions cannot be absolute and perfect, but rather are practices constituted by creativity. Furthermore, Asad identifies practitioners of *ijtihād* (*mujtahidūn*) as those who are intent on eliciting truth.⁶⁰ Also, the primary meaning of truth is to become "suitable to the requirements of wisdom, justice, right or rightness . . . [my emphasis]."⁶¹ By implication, *ijtihād* is a practice that seeks to articulate truth and justice. Considering that justice, in the words of al-Attas (who links justice to order, i.e., "orderliness")⁶² "means a harmonious condition . . . whereby everything is in its right and proper place,"⁶³ it follows that *ijtihād* is a creative practice that seeks to articulate truth and justice.

Thus far, I have established the links between creative human practices (*a'māl*, *jihad*, and *ijtihād*) and their articulation of truth (*ḥaqq*) and justice (*ʿadl*). I shall now look at some of the salient epistemological underpinnings that, invariably, impact on these creative human practices. It is my contention that the epistemological underpinnings of *tafakkur* and its synonyms (*fiqh*, *fahm*, *ma'rifah*, *ilm*, and *ḥikmah*) seek to articulate truth and justice in human practices.

***Tafakkur* and Its Links with Creative Practices**

Thus far, I have argued that creative human practices (e.g., *a'māl*, *jihad*, and *ijtihād*) seek to articulate truth and justice. I shall now argue that these practices are underpinned by the notion of *tafakkur* (thought). In turn, I shall link the creative practice of *tafakkur* to the application of *fiqh/fahm* (right understanding), *ilm/ma'rifah* (knowledge), and *ḥikmah*. In this way, I hope to establish further the link between creative human practices, truth, and justice.

Drawing on Lane's definition that *a'māl* means "action of the (human) mind"⁶⁴ and bearing in mind that *a'māl*, *jihad*, and *ijtihād* are all practices that seek to articulate truth and justice, it follows that these practices are

actuated by means of “actions of the mind.” What are these actions? First, the Prophet is described as the expounder of Qur’anic guidance:

And We have sent down unto thee (also) the Message; that thou mayest explain clearly to men what is sent for them, and that they may give thought [*tafakkur*] (my emphasis). (Qur’an 16:44 [late Makkan revelation])

This verse makes it clear that Qur’anic guidance is not just a matter of unquestioning acceptance, but also one of thought, a concept that allows for questioning and challenging.

But, how does one give thought (*tafakkara*)? In Qur’an 45:13, *āyāt* (signs that refer to revealed and nonrevealed knowledge) are connected to the verb *tafakkara*:

And He has made subservient to you, [as a gift] from Himself, all that is in the heavens and on earth: in this, behold, there are (*āyāt*) messages⁶⁵ for people who *think!* [my emphasis].⁶⁶

This verse exhorts individuals to embark on *tafakkur*, by which is meant the ability to reflect and think while pursuing the understanding of the *āyāt* of God. Bearing in mind that *a’māl*, jihad, and *ijtihād* are all practices that seek to understand revealed and nonrevealed knowledge, and that *tafakkur* is also regarded as an action designed to acquire an understanding of *āyāt*, it can be claimed that creative practices are constituted by *tafakkur*. Hence, *tafakkur* means to reflect and also to mold thoughts in a creative manner in the pursuit of practicing Islam.

Second, *āyāt* are coupled with the verb *faqiha*:

And He is it who has brought you (all) into being out of one living entity, and (has appointed for each of you) a time-limit (on Earth) and a resting-place (after death): clearly, indeed, have We spelled [*fassala*, defined as “to present in a creative order”⁶⁷] these messages [*āyāt*] unto people who can grasp the truth [*yafqahūn*, which is derived from *faqiha* and defined as “to understand the truth”].⁶⁸

In this verse, *āyāt* are depicted as having “creative order.” In other words, *āyāt* dealing with the origin of human creation from one living entity, followed by a description of humanity’s sojourn on Earth and its abode in the hereafter, are presented creatively. What follows from this is that an understanding of the truth of Qur’anic revelation (*faqiha*) presupposes a creative understanding of *āyāt*. It is not surprising to note that *Ṣaḥīḥ al Bukhārī* mentions a hadith that considers those who have *faqiha* (the right understanding) of the Qur’an as having gained the bounty of God:

If Allah wants to do good to a person, he makes him comprehend (*yufaqqah*, derived from *faqih*) the religion.⁶⁹

Bearing in mind that *faqih*, like *tafakkur*, is linked to a creative understanding of revealed and nonrevealed knowledge, the creative actions of *a'māl*, jihad, and *ijtihād* have to be constituted by *fiqh* (right understanding).

Third, the Qur'an is replete with verses that link *āyāt* to *ya'lamūn*⁷⁰ (derived from *'alima*, which, according to Lane, means "to know or to become acquainted with").⁷¹ For example, it is stated that:

He it is who has made the sun a [source of] radiant light and the moon a light [reflected], and has determined for its phases so that you might know how to compute the years and to measure [time]. None of this has God created without [an inner] *truth*. Clearly does He spell out these messages (*āyāt*) unto people of [innate] knowledge (my emphasis). (Qur'an 27:52)⁷²

In fact, *'ālim* (derived from *'alima*) is a term applied to human action, as well as being a "faculty firmly rooted in the mind."⁷³ It follows from this that human actions, such as to give thought, can be linked to the action of an *'ālim* ("one who does according to his knowledge").⁷⁴ Consequently, the practices of an *'ālim* cannot be thoughtless. For this reason, an *'ālim* is said to possess *ḥikmah* (wisdom), which, according to Lane, signifies that notion that restrains or prevents thoughtless action.⁷⁵ And, if an *'ālim* has to acquire knowledge about *āyāt*, and if an understanding of the latter requires effort (*a'māl*), striving (jihad), and continuous intellectual exertion (*ijtihād*), it can be said that these creative practices are guided by the actions of an *'ālim*. It is therefore not surprising that an individual's capacity (as *'ālim* in order to be creative through *a'māl*, jihad, and *ijtihād*) is considered as one of the reasons for humanity's "unique position"⁷⁶ and, as claimed by al-Attas, "the most valuable and distinctive gift of man."⁷⁷ In addition, al-Ṭabaṭabā'ī also considers *'ilm* (a synonym of *ma'rifah*)⁷⁸ as the foundation of *ḥikmah* (wisdom) and *fahm* (understanding).⁷⁹ Hence, the practices of an *'ālim* are constituted by the *a'māl* of wisdom and understanding.

It follows that an *'ālim* is one who embarks upon creative practices in order to understand both revealed and nonrevealed knowledge. Hence, actions of the mind, such as that of an *'ālim*, seek to articulate truth and justice in creative practices. Such a view is supported by a hadith, narrated by Ibn 'Abbās, in which the Prophet is reported to have prayed to God to bestow knowledge (*'allimhu*, derived from *'alima*) of the Qur'an on Ibn 'Abbās.⁸⁰ In another hadith, Abū Dardā' reports that the Prophet regarded an *'ālim* as superior to a worshipper:

The superiority of the learned man (*'ālim*) over the devout man is like that of the full moon over the rest of the stars. The learned are

the heir of the prophets who leave an inheritance . . . only of knowledge, and he who acquires it, acquires an abundant portion.⁸¹

From this hadith, it is evident that the early Muslims practiced thinking and understanding, both of which are essential aspects of creative human practices.

In conclusion, I have argued that God's creativity is complete, whereas creative human action is one of *a'māl*, *jihad*, and *ijtihad*. Creative human actions are necessary in order to articulate truth and justice, the concepts that link up conceptually with *tafakkur* and its synonyms, such as *fiqh*, *fahm*, and *ma'rifah*. Without creative actions, there would be no scope for innovation and flexibility in thinking and understanding.

Endnotes

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29. Muḥammad 'Alī al Šabūnī, *Mukhtasar Tafsiir Ibn Kathīr* (Beirut: Dār al Qur'an al Kaarim, 1981), 2:25.
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31. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, 803.
32. Qur'an 23:14 and 37:125.
33. Abdullah, *Educational Theory*, 49.
34. Saiyidain, *Iqbal's Educational Philosophy*, 75.
35. Al Ṭabaṭabā'ī, *al Mizān*, 4:42.
36. Al Šabūnī, *Mukhtasar*, 2:25.
37. Khan, trans., *Šahīh al Bukhārī*, 1:90.
38. Cowan, ed., *Dictionary*, 645; al Rāghib, *al Mufradāt*, 360.
39. Imām Yahyā bin Sharaf-udin al-Nawawī, *Riyāḍ al Šālīhin*, vols. 1 and 2, trans. A. R. Shad (Lahore: Kazi Publications, 1988), 235.
40. Khan, trans., *Šahīh al Bukhārī*, 9:309.
41. S. N. al-Attas, *Islam, Secularism and the Philosophy of the Future* (London: Mansell, 1985), 101.
42. Ibid., 71.
43. Al Rāghib, *al Mufradāt*, 99.
44. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, 473.
45. Al Rāghib, *al Mufradāt*, 99.
46. Ismā'īl Ḥaḳīqī al Burūsīy, *Tafsiir Rūh al Bayān* (Istanbul: Matba Usmaniyyah, 1913), 3:54.
47. Ibid., 54.
48. In Qur'an 69:51, a reference is made to *ḥaqq al yaqīn* (absolute truth).
49. Al Ṭabaṭabā'ī, *al Mizān*, 4:172.
50. A. Ḥasan, trans., *Sunan Abī Dāwūd* (Lahore: Ashraf Printing Press, 1984), 2:687.
51. Daud, *Concept of Knowledge*, 32.
52. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, 473.
53. Asad, *Message of the Qur'an*, 120.
54. Daud, *Concept of Knowledge*, 85.
55. Ḥasan, trans.) *Sunan Abī Dāwūd*, 3:1019.
56. Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 144.
57. Ibid.
58. Abdullah, *Educational Theory*, 41.
59. Ibid.
60. Asad, *Message of the Qur'an*, 120.
61. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, 605.
62. Al-Attas, *Islam, Secularism*, 101.
63. Ibid., 71.
64. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, 2159.
65. Other Quranic verses in which *āyāt* are linked to the verb *tafakkara* include 2:219, 266; 10:24; 13:3; 16:11, 69; 30:21; and 39:42.
66. Asad, *Message of the Qur'an*, 766.
67. Cowan, ed., *Dictionary*, 715.
68. Asad, *Message of the Qur'an*, 186.
69. Khan, trans., *Šahīh al Bukhārī*, 1:61.

70. See Qur'an 2:164; 3:118; 6:97; 7:32; 9:11; 10:5; 13:4; and 16:12.
71. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, 2138.
72. Asad, *Message of the Qur'an*, 289.
73. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, 2141.
74. *Ibid.*, 2141.
75. *Ibid.*, 617.
76. Daud, *Concept of Knowledge*, 16.
77. Al-Attas, *Islam, Secularism*, 101.
78. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, 2141.
79. Al Ṭabaṭabā'ī, *al Mizān*, 4:46.
80. Khan, trans., *Ṣaḥīḥ al Bukhārī*, 1:64.
81. Al Nawawī, trans., *Riyāḍ al Ṣāliḥīn*, 2:236.