

Populism and Secularism in Turkey: The Headscarf Ban Policy

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Abstract

This article analyzes the impact of two key components of Kemalist ideology, populism and secularism, on the policymaking process of modern Turkey by utilizing historical institutionalism and the political-cultural approach. The Headscarf Ban Policy, which has been implemented discretionarily since 1981 and intensively since 1997, provides an illustrative case study of the broader debates over freedom of religion, secularism, and democracy, and helps to uncover the influence of populism and secularism, as well as the interaction between these two principles. The analysis reveals the principle of populism, which has been much overlooked in the literature, as a key determinant of state-centric reforms as well as a method of legitimizing the undemocratic version of secularism advocated by the state.

Introduction

Since 1981, women who wear headscarves have been legally banned from attending private or public schools and working at public enterprises in the Republic of Turkey. The current debate on the Headscarf Ban Policy (HBP) is illustrative of broader debates over the freedom of religion, secularism, and democracy. The main aim of this article is to identify and analyze the causes of the HBP by utilizing historical institutionalism and the political-cultural approach. The HBP is important for two main reasons: It has direct implications for the religious freedom of the 70 percent of Turkish

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women who wear the headscarf.¹ Moreover, all predominantly Muslim countries are faced with the challenging question of what Islam's role is, or should be, in a democratic system. Although I will discuss this issue in the context of modern Turkey, the arguments and findings have broader implications, and, hopefully, will contribute to the literature on democratization and secularism.

In this article, I argue that two components of Kemalist ideology,² namely, populism and secularism, have been used to legitimize the top-down reforms concerning public and private life, have shaped modern Turkey's institutional framework, and are the key determinants of the state's current policymaking process. In other words, at the point of its establishment, the state was defined as, and was given the right to be, the shaper of its citizens' public and private lives. The priorities were westernization and secularization, and individual freedoms could be sacrificed for these state objectives. The causes of the current state policies concerning religious liberties, and in particular the HBP, can be traced back to this original prototype of the state institutions created by Mustafa Kemal.

Research Design

This article is a qualitative single-country case study carried out mainly for the purpose of theory development. I analyze the reasons behind the HBP in Turkey from within the framework of state-building ideologies during the twentieth century. I use the process-tracing method to test my theory by observing and analyzing the events that took place from 1923 to the present in Turkey. The unfolding of the state-centered policies that shaped the secularization process and the social responses to the radical reforms require such an approach. As Stephen Vanevera states:

In process tracing the investigator explores the chain of events or the decision-making process by which initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes. The cause-effect link that connects independent variable and outcome is unwrapped and divided into smaller steps; then the investigator looks for observable evidence of each step.³

Even though the HBP is a contemporary phenomenon, the actual dynamics of state-building that yielded the institutional superiority over society can be understood only by looking at the past and identifying the causal chains. Analyzing the HBP's causes requires unearthing the institutional structures, forces, and ideologies that act as the driving mecha-

nisms of the current policy and decisionmaking process that leads to the current outcomes. Therefore, I trace backward the causal process by trying to infer “what caused the cause” at each stage and seek to identify the HPB’s prime cause.⁴ Thus, I contend that the case of Turkey’s headscarf ban lends itself perfectly to this methodology and that process tracing is the most appropriate method of analysis for the question of this particular study.

As primary sources, I use the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, legal documents of court cases, and declarations of statutes in *Resmi Gazete* (Legal Newspaper) and YOKKM (Legal Statement about the Dress Code in Higher Education Institutions). The journal and newspaper articles, books, and online accounts provide secondary sources, as listed in the accompanying endnotes.

Theoretic Approach and Hypothesis

I employ historical institutionalism and political-cultural theory to analyze this case. Even though these two approaches are not *a priori* superior to other approaches employed in political science, this study’s specific research question, available facts, and context are best understood by combining these two approaches.

Historical Institutionalism

Historical institutionalism explains “the way institutions shape the goals political actors pursue and the way they structure power relations among them, privileging some and putting others at a disadvantage.”⁵ Similarly, to comprehend the dynamics of the policymaking process in Turkey, it is necessary to trace the political processes and unearth the role of institutions in policymaking.⁶ Also, historical institutionalism attributes “social causation” to path dependency, claiming that the effects of operative “forces are mediated through contextual features of a situation inherited from the past.”⁷ In other words, ideas and other factors that shape today’s policymaking process are path-dependent on history. Historical institutionalism is inclusive of other factors (e.g., ideas, beliefs, and culture) and analyzes macrocontexts, rather than narrow contexts, to determine the combined effects of institutions and processes.⁸ I employ the narrow definition of institution to refer to the impact of those state institutions that have legitimate authority.⁹ In this study, institutions specifically refer to the state’s legislature, executive, judiciary, and military components.

Political-Cultural Theory

Two aspects of political-cultural theory make it particularly appropriate for this case study: the continuity of the culture principle and Eckstein's theory of political transformations. First, as Castles argues, "history leaves a legacy of ideas, customs and institutions – in sum, a culture – that influences the present behavior of those who shape the policies of the state and those who make demands of the state."¹⁰ Political-cultural theory regards political continuity as the "normal" state¹¹ and, therefore, helps explain the unchanging nature of the fundamentals of Turkish culture. Moreover, Eckstein's theory of political change fits perfectly with the dynamics of the Kemalist revolution. He defines political transformation as "the use of political power and artifice to engineer radically changed social and political structures, thus culture patterns and themes, to set society and polity on new courses toward unprecedented objectives."¹² Kemal's revolutionary transformative process, which was carried out by suppressive power and control, supports this theory of political transformation.¹³ Eckstein outlines the outcomes of such social engineering projects:

If the conventional norms and practices of political life are disrupted by revolution, what can be put in their place? We may posit the answer that revolutionary transformation will initially be attempted by despotic or legalistic means. What, after all, can "order" societies and polities in place of conventional, internalized culture? Only brute power, or else the use of external legal prescriptions as a surrogate for internal orientational guides to behavior.¹⁴

Eckstein argues that the long-term outcomes of these types of revolutionary transformations will "diverge considerably from revolutionary intentions and resemble more the pre-Revolutionary condition of society."¹⁵ Exactly as his theory predicts, the "massive cultural disruptions" that took place in Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s led to "unintended outcomes" in that any contemporary religious revival was exactly what Kemal sought to eliminate.

Hypothesis

Based on historical institutionalism and political cultural theory, I hypothesize that the Turkish state legitimizes the forceful implementation of radical secularizing reforms on the principle of populism, which places state objectives in front of those of society and individual freedoms by default. The role

of state institutions and the persistence of culture correspond with the theoretical framework of these two approaches. For the purposes of this article, I use a narrow definition of culture and national values to refer only to religious beliefs and practices.

Numerous closely linked antecedent conditions magnify the causal relationship of the proposed hypothesis. These antecedent conditions are the ambiguity or lack of a precise legal definition of secularism, the lack of any separation of powers, and the military's influence over the government in power and the judicial decisionmaking process (judges). One can argue that the principle of populism (or Kemalist ideology in general) is also the cause of these situations; therefore, they are not detached from the independent variable.

Alternative hypotheses based on rival theoretical approaches may attribute the current HBP to the patriarchal structure of the Turkish state (gender-based approaches) or party politics in Turkey (the political mobilization approach). Although the outcome of the HBP affects women disproportionately, the HBP is part of a wide range of state policies targeting all religious citizens. Likewise, the rise of religiously affiliated political parties (i.e. the Welfare party in 1995) can be seen as a factor that triggered state control over religious activities. However, it is not a cause of the headscarf ban policy exclusively. In the remainder of this article, I will demonstrate the causal link between the HBP and the Kemalist principles of populism and secularism as state institutions during the twentieth century.

Case Description

Since its establishment in 1923, the Republic of Turkey has struggled with an ongoing mission of democratization. In its fairly short history, Turkey has undergone major structural changes (i.e., a shift from a one-party to a multi-party system), witnessed three military coups (1960, 1971, and 1980), and one "soft" coup (1997). Despite numerous authoritarian policies and the military's ceaseless surveillance of the government, Turkey, at least in theory, has maintained its commitment to republicanism and constitutionalism.¹⁶ The growth of a vibrant civil society composed of groups representing a wide spectrum of interests has resulted in a push for greater equality, justice, and political participation.

One particular segment of civil society is that of practicing Muslims, who have been marginalized by the state's secularist mission. The interaction between the state and these citizens constitutes a test of democracy.

Recently, one of the most prevalent and challenging policy areas illustrating this confrontation between the secular state and its citizens has been the headscarf ban. It is necessary to analyze historical developments within this society and its state institutions in order to understand the cultural, political, and societal mechanisms that brought about this confrontation.

The Role of Religion before the Kemalist Reforms

“Throughout Ottoman history (1299-1922), religion served as a mediating cultural and political bridge between the state and society.”¹⁷ The Ottoman Empire carried the caliphate, the guardian of the Islamic heritage, and thus was the apex of the greater Muslim world. The sultan was a political leader who obtained his legitimacy through Islam, which eliminated any “tension between the state and an independent ‘church’ similar to that which existed for centuries in Europe...”¹⁸ The nature of Islam under the Ottoman Empire is commonly described as cosmopolitan and pluralist in nature. For instance, the empire established various systems to deal with the twenty-three different nations under its sovereignty, which “helped to institutionalize a ‘tolerable’ minority status for different religious groups.”¹⁹

One Ottoman legacy was its formative development, which helped to promote a “liberal” frontier Islam.²⁰ Bernard Lewis defines Turkey’s frontier Islamic identity as being “fluid, institutionally fragmented, and multiple in their loyalties and shared understandings – laws, norms, customs, and overlapping roles.”²¹ Ottoman rule shaped the development of Islamic sciences, arts, and legal codes for over six centuries without radical or dogmatic indoctrination emerging from the empire-sponsored popular religious mainstream. Religion was evidently a natural part of public and private life, and all walks of life, including academics and jurisprudence, were guided by religious teachings.

The Initial Implementation of Kemalist Reforms (1923-50)

The Republic of Turkey was established following the Ottoman Empire’s collapse after the First World War and the successful completion of the ensuing Independence War (1918-23), led mainly by General Mustafa Kemal. After this war, Kemal launched a state-building mission and became the first president of modern Turkey.²² His ideologies, which came to be known as Kemalism, were the shaping forces behind the subsequent social engineering projects.²³

Two of Kemalism's fundamental principles, namely, populism and secularism, can be designated as the original sources and catalysts of the state's current attitudes toward wearing the headscarf. Populism refers to the social content and goal of the Kemalist revolution. The elitist social reforms were legitimized by the principle of populism, which "recognized the validity of popular sovereignty to the degree circumscribed by the requirements of national unity, sovereignty, and reconstruction. It was made the new cornerstone of the new political doctrine..."²⁴ Kemalist secularism did not merely mean the separation of state and religion, but also the separation of religion from educational, cultural, and legal affairs. It meant the independence of thought and of institutions from the dominance of religious doctrines.

Kemal was adamantly committed to westernization and secularization, which, according to him, required Turkey's breaking its cultural and religious ties with its Ottoman past. Therefore, the policies he initiated during the Kemalist revolution ripped Islam away from Turkey's social fabric.²⁵ He did not have any difficulty in transforming his vision into public policy under the "military-bureaucratic"²⁶ regime that he established. Some of the policies were as follows:

- Establishing the Directorate of Religious Affairs: Under this new institutional framework, all religious staff had to be trained, employed, and controlled by the state. According to Yavuz, its mission was "to control and domesticate Islam in accordance with the needs of the state."²⁷
- Adopting the Swiss civil code.
- Reforming the educational system: The Unity of Education law was one of the most powerful tools to indoctrinate the entire nation with the state ideologies of secularism and westernization. All religious schools were outlawed, and even private institutions were subject to state-monitored curriculum. All Islamic schools and private meetings to study Islam were outlawed.

These communitarian policies were put in place rapidly under the genre of *inkilap*, reforms that were propagated by the state as the means for modernization as well as economic development. It has to be noted that the First World War and the subsequent Independence War had left the entire nation destitute. The conditions, therefore, were ripe for taking advantage of the people by promises of economic advancement. Westernization "was presented as

emancipatory and anti-religious, without the critical post-Enlightenment thought on tolerance, liberalism and democracy.”²²⁸

The Two-party System and Changes in Public Policies

After the death of Kemal (1938), there was a gradual shift to a two-party system (1950). The new Democrat party, which was less committed to carrying out the ideals of Kemalism, won the national elections.²⁹ This party was more receptive to the religious demands of Turkey’s citizens and pursued more flexible policies. For instance, the call to prayer was once again recited in Arabic (it had been changed to Turkish), Qur’anic courses and the training of public preachers (imams) were allowed, and the state’s control over religious activities was relaxed.

Islamist parties began to be formed in the 1970s and gained more power throughout the 1980s. Meanwhile, “in response to forced exclusion, many Muslims began to establish their own informal networks and education system to preserve and protect their sacred realm from the reaches of the radical republican state.”³⁰ Thus, in the last two decades, Turkey has seen a growing number of internal Islamic movements as well as religious revivalism. As the political-cultural theory predicts, this trend is a return to the pre-republic status quo, where the unifying factor of the nation’s Islamic movements is “to resist the totalitarian and homogenizing policies of the Kemalist state.”³¹

Policies on Dress during the Republic

One of the first and most prevalent examples of the new regime’s agenda was to “westernize” its citizens. This simply meant to dress, act, and talk like Europeans in the hope that such changes would impact the people’s way of thinking and religious attitudes. In 1925, a law prohibiting the traditional hat (fez) was passed. Turkish men were required to wear western-style hats, and disobedience was punished severely – sometimes with execution. This law can be pointed to as the starting point of state’s (self-legitimized) interference with how citizens dress. In the same year, another law (No. 2413) regulated civil servant dress codes and “required them to dress ‘like their partners in civilized nations of the world.’”³² This justification demonstrates clearly the state’s obsession with modernization (westernization) at the expense of personal autonomy.

However, it was not until 1981 that the Council of Ministers passed a statute (No. 8/3349) prohibiting the wearing of headscarves by employees

and students in public institutions and schools.³³ In 1982, the Council of Higher Education (YOK) banned students from wearing headscarves in universities. The resulting widespread protest against this ban forced the YOK to allow headscarves that were “more in line with contemporary dress,” namely, smaller scarves as opposed to larger and darker-colored ones.³⁴ However, in 1987 the Kemalists, led by President Kenan Evran (a former general, which aligns him automatically with the secularists in the Turkish context) banned wearing the headscarf, only to have it made legal once again by the YOK in 1989.

The Judiciary’s Role in Headscarf Policies

In 1982, 1984, 1987, and 1989, the Constitutional Court turned down all appeals from citizens who were denied access to educational institutions, declaring that wearing a headscarf in public institutions was unconstitutional. However, despite the legislature’s statutes and the Constitutional Court’s decisions, implementing the HBP was left to the discretion of the chancellors, deans, and faculties. The National Security Council’s decision to identify Islamic fundamentalism as the most serious threat to Turkey’s national security was the turning point in the headscarf ban debate.³⁵ Yavuz defines February 1997 as “the fourth military coup to protect the state and democracy from the people”³⁶:

In 1997, the generals decided to cleanse the public sphere of the growing Muslim presence. The military once again intervened directly in the civilian sphere, declaring peaceful and democratic Turkish Islamic and Kurdish identity aspirations to be national security threats, and orchestrating a soft-coup against the pro-Islamic Welfare coalition government by forcing the government to engage in the cleansing of Islamists from the public sphere.³⁷

In its 1997 decisions “the Turkish court argued that laicism is not only a separation between religion and politics but also a necessary division between religion and society. This justified regulation of social life, education, family, economy, law, daily code of conduct and dress-code in accordance with the needs of everyday life and the Kemalist principles.”³⁸

The Current Constitutional Dispute

Women who pursued litigation to seek their rights pointed to three articles in the current Turkish constitution (1982)³⁹:

- Article 24, which guarantees the freedom of expression,
- Article 10, which prohibits discrimination due to religious belief, ethnicity, etc., and
- Article 42, which guarantees the right to education for all citizens of the Turkish Republic.

On the other side, the Constitutional Court outlawed the wearing of headscarves in universities and in public enterprises, arguing that “in a laicist order, religion is prevented from politicization, and becoming an administrative device, and kept in its real respectable place in the people’s consciousness.”⁴⁰ Thus, the Constitutional Court claims to have the right to define the boundaries of religion and to control where, when, and how people are allowed to express their religious beliefs. Controversially, it also declared that the demand to wear the headscarf was against the principle of equal treatment and religious freedom, since “allowing the headcover would not only be a privilege given to Islamist students, but it would allow for their unequal treatment by differentiating them from others.”⁴¹ Likewise, the Council of State declared the headscarf to be against secularism and women’s rights on the grounds that “rather than an innocent custom, it has become a symbol of a worldview opposed to the fundamental principles of the Republic and opposed to women’s liberation.”⁴²

Case Analysis and Discussion

As has been revealed through the dynamics of the headscarf ban in Turkey, the reawakening of Islamic identity within Turkish society and the increasing demands of its citizens to reassert their Islamic heritage demonstrates the desire for and an active return to the traditions of the Ottoman legacy. The Kemalist revolution disrupted the internalized culture by despotic means. However, as Yavuz states: “... an Islamic-oriented identity, although existing prior to the foundation of the Republican state’s radical homogenizing reforms, lay dormant in Turkey for some time” only to be revived in a stronger form.⁴³ The Kemalist revolution’s radical and artificial social engineering project could not succeed in cutting the nation off from its pre-republic Islamic identity, and thus Islam is reclaiming its place in Turkey’s sociopolitical sphere. These social dynamics in Turkey correspond with and strongly affirm Eckstein’s theory.

The HBP case also reveals the paradoxical and undemocratic nature of the Kemalist principles of populism and secularism. These ideologies are

formal, deliberate, and codified principles that have been the driving forces behind numerous communitarian social policies. Although the general public has always contested these policies, outspoken protest has gradually increased in recent years due to “exported” liberalization, increased political awareness, and participation brought by what Yavuz calls *opportunity spaces*.

Even though secularism is the alleged reason, I argue that populism is the necessary means for the state to carry out its mission of secularism through authoritarian social policies. If the populism principle had not been inserted into the constitution to legitimize the prioritization of state objectives in spite of popular protest, the state would have lacked the substantial institutionalized support needed to implement its forceful secularizing reforms. Therefore, unlike what is commonly stated, the statist version of secularism is not the only authoritarian element that needs to be reformed to reinstate democracy, for secularism and populism have equal weight in authoritarian policymaking.

Davidson argues that secularism connotes “a political sphere that is not influenced by religion.”⁴⁴ However, in Turkey “the militant secularism of the state amounted to rigid state control over religious life and a strict laicism in public affairs, rather than the institutional separation of Church and State or the decline of personal belief.”⁴⁵ The state’s version of secularism forces the citizens to make an impossible choice: “Am I a Muslim first or a citizen of my country?” while populism allows the state to define and enforce the common good for the people.⁴⁶ Therefore, the Kemalist version of populism and secularism is the prime cause of the current political debate on the headscarf dispute in Turkey today.

The Constitutional Court’s arguments in declaring the headscarf to be unconstitutional consist of the following assertions: the headscarf is against women’s rights and liberties, is a political symbol, and is a threat for organizing the state according to the dictates of Islam. Hence, allowing it would mean the unequal treatment of citizens. Even though most Kemalist academics acknowledge that it is undemocratic for the state to impose its secularist ideals⁴⁷ and ban the headscarf, they still justify the ban mainly by the following two arguments:

1. “...*many women* who come from traditional families are expected to cover their heads, which does not allow them freedom of choice or autonomy”⁴⁸ (*italics added*). This very common assumption or claim has not been tested empirically. The one and only survey cited above (Cark-

oglu and Toprak) did not feature a question on whether or not women freely chose to wear the headscarf. I argue that, to the contrary, the majority of women affected by the HBP are those highly educated urban women who, in most cases, make a personal decision to wear it despite the pressure from their families and husbands not to do so. Hence, an extensive and well-drafted public survey is needed to confirm or negate these claims.

2. The state and the Kemalist elite fears that the people who wear the headscarf or support this practice also support the implementation of an Islamic state to replace the republic. This alleged threat has been widely criticized as being unsubstantiated, especially because the nature of Turkey's Islamic social movements is characterized as peaceful, modernizing, and democracy-seeking.⁴⁹

Since these arguments lack substantial and scholarly evidence, it is necessary to critically evaluate the reasons for implementing the HBP. If we hypothesize that many or some women do not wear the headscarf due to personal choice but are subject to parental or spousal pressure, this leaves some or many women who exercise their personal autonomy by deciding to express their religious beliefs in a certain way according to their personal interpretations of Islamic doctrines. Can the HBP ban be justified in order to protect women who are subject to some form of pressure? Could other ways of eliminating this undesirable pressure be found that do not violate the other women's rights to express their religious beliefs?

Likewise, if we hypothesize that some of the people who wear the headscarf or who support this practice also support the implementation of an Islamic state, this leaves many or some that do not support such a political ideology. On the other hand, they praise democracy, demand equal rights to practice their religion, and respect the rights of others to live as they choose.⁵⁰ Hence, the headscarf dispute illustrates the state's power, embedded in the principle of populism, over individual freedoms.

This constitutional debate is subsumed within the overarching issue of the Kemalist elite taking advantage of state-centered institutions to maintain its power and privileges. State institutions that carry out these policies have been formalized by Kemalist values that contradict Turkey's national values or culture. The policy outcomes that emerge from these institutions (or the Kemalist ideologies of these institutions) lack legitimacy and are, therefore, forcefully imposed on society. How state institutions function in the headscarf case is rather extraordinary: Adopting a deceptive democratic

façade, they legitimize undemocratic policies by referring to Kemalist principles.

Conclusion

The Turkish nation is 99 percent Muslim, and 70 percent of its women wear the headscarf.⁵¹ The problem of compatibility between Islam and the Kemalist version of secular democracy has to be addressed with effective policy solutions. The state has to resolve how to democratically reconcile the demands of (the majority of) its citizens with the statist goals of secularization and westernization. All of the theoretical issues discussed in this article demand practical solutions to ease the culminating tensions between the state and majority of the Turkish population.

Some of the HPB's positive outcomes are evident in the increased political participation and empowerment of women. Arat elaborates on the positive implications of civil society:

Islamist women as well as a number of academicians have documented how covering their heads and leading Islamic lives allowed women to exercise autonomy, at times in opposition to their parents who disapproved of their headscarves, at times against the state or social pressure (Arat 1991, Gole 1996, Ozdalga 1998). These women's discovery of an alternative religious life allowed them to challenge established customs or parental expectations. They learned how to fight for their beliefs and how to express themselves against societal pressure. As individuals, they were empowered.⁵²

It is not democratic for a state to impinge on its citizens' basic human rights based on assumptions or fears of some possible "future" threat. As Galeotti states, "the possibility of the free rider fundamentalist, who makes an opportunistic use of liberal institutions to destroy them, seems more a fantasy of the Western mind than a real threat."⁵³ Even if this alleged threat were grounded, it is the state's responsibility to guard democracy democratically. The state should clearly delineate where the Islamic groups' demands would impinge upon its "democratic principles." For example, a demand to replace the entire constitution with the Shari`ah would be incompatible with democracy. The state should clarify those democratic principles upon which its policies are based: that of potential harm, westernization, or its own discretion, for example.

It is evident, even from the secular Kemalist academics' arguments, that the HBP is undemocratic and that the Constitutional Court's interpretation

of the constitution contradicts those provisions related to the freedom of religion and of religious expression. Even though there are seemingly democratic institutions, a popularly elected legislature, a constitution, and a judiciary, the state mechanism's overall functioning is undemocratic. There are clear contradictions between what is written in the Constitution, the ban's inconsistent implementation, and the Constitutional Court's discretionary interpretations of the laws. The headscarf dispute illustrates the state's power (embedded in the principle of populism) over individual freedoms. The loopholes in the Constitution, the unclear definition of secularism, and the authoritarian nature of state secularism make such undemocratic rulings possible. In other words, the judiciary is not an independent institution, for the military oversees judicial decisionmaking, and the separation of powers is non-existent.

Turkey must find a peaceful and democratic resolution to the headscarf debate. There is a pressing need to draft policies compatible with the principles of a liberal democratic version of secularism (Anglo-Saxon secularism) and to incorporate the majority's demands by pursuing more inclusive strategies. Turkish political history demonstrates how "an Islamic opposition may integrate itself into a modern democratic system,"²⁵⁴ and it therefore constitutes a crucial example for the other Muslim countries. However, this peaceful and democratic integration is possible only if "Islamic values are not banned from politics by a fanatical call for secularism, but respected as a legitimate voice."²⁵⁵ I strongly agree with Yavuz that Turkey needs "a new social contract in which ethnic and religious diversity will be respected."²⁵⁶ Consequently, Turkey's institutional set-up under the Kemalist principles of populism and secularism, which were devised in the 1920s, affects current public policies. The lack of emphasis on protecting individual freedoms can be attributed to the state's priority of protecting the status quo, which privileges the Kemalist elite, at the expense of its citizens' rights.

Endnotes

1. Tarhan Erdem, "Turban Dosyasi," *Milliyet Newspaper*, 27 May 2003. Online at: www.milliyet.com.tr/2003/05/27/guncel/agun.html.
2. Kemalism consists of six principles: republicanism, populism, secularism, reformism, nationalism, and statism. For a more detailed analysis, see Jacob M. Landau, *Ataturk and the Modernization of Turkey* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press: 1984).

3. Stephen Vanevera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 64.
4. *Ibid.*, 70.
5. Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," *Political Studies Association*, no. 64 (1996): 940.
6. Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds. *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 2.
7. Hall and Taylor, "Political Science," 942.
8. Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, "Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science," in *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, eds. Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner (New York: Norton, 2002), 693-721.
9. S. Laurel Weldon, *Protest, Policy, and the Protest of Violence against Women: A Cross-National Comparison* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 2002), 107.
10. Francis G. Castles, ed., *Families of Nations: Patterns of Public Policy in Western Democracies* (USA: Dartmouth, 1993), xvi.
11. Harry Eckstein, "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change," *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 3 (September 1988): 790.
12. *Ibid.*, 798.
13. *Ibid.*, 799.
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*, 800.
16. Freedom House has rated Turkey as 3 (partly free) on its democracy scale of 1 to 7 (1: Free and 7: Not Free). See www.freedomhouse.org/research/free-world/2005/combined2005.pdf.
17. Hakan Yavuz and John Esposito, eds., *Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gulen Movement* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2003), 38.
18. *Ibid.*, 41.
19. *Ibid.*, 40. For instance, Muslims were judged in an Islamic court, whereas Christians were subject to secular legal codes.
20. *Ibid.*, 39.
21. As paraphrased in *ibid.*, 39.
22. The only party was Kemal's Republican People's party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi [CHP]), and he was the sole candidate for presidency.
23. For Kemalism, see endnote 1.
24. Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 462.
25. Hakan Yavuz, "Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere," *Journal of International Affairs* 54, no. 1 (Fall 2000): 22.
26. *Ibid.*, 25.
27. *Ibid.*, 29.
28. *Ibid.*, 24.

29. The immediate shift in citizen preference for the Democrat party is similar to what happened in the 1994 elections. As soon as there was a choice between leftist and rightist parties, the majority of the citizens (21 percent) voted for the Islamic Welfare party.
30. *Ibid.*, 25.
31. *Ibid.*, 28.
32. Yesim Arat, "Islamist Women, Their Headscarves and Democracy in Turkey," 2000. Online at: www.bgu.ac.il/humphrey/seminar/yasim.htm.
33. For detailed information on the powers of the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary, see www.turkishembassy.org/governmentpolitics/politics.htm.
34. Elizabeth Ozdalga, *The Veiling Issue, Official Secularism and Popular Islam in Modern Turkey* (Surrey, UK: Curzon Publications, 1998), 41.
35. The secretary general of the National Security Council is a military official appointed by the Supreme Military Council of Turkey. Therefore, the decision-making process is dictated by the Turkish military.
36. Mehmet Ali Kislali's article in the Turkish daily newspaper *Radikal*, "TC'yi kim koruyacak?" 7 March 2000, as quoted in Yavuz, "Cleansing Islam," 27.
37. John Doxey, "A soft-coup in Turkey," *New Leader* (10 March 1997), 12-14, as paraphrased in *ibid.*, 37.
38. *Ibid.*, 38.
39. For the full text of the Turkish constitution in English, see www.mfa.gov.tr/grupc/ca/cag/I142.htm.
40. YOKKM, p. 4, as quoted in Arat, "Islamist Women," trans. Yesim Arat.
41. *Ibid.*
42. YOK. "YOKKM: Yuksekogretim Kurumlarında Kilik Kiyafet ile Ilgili Mevzuat ve Hukuki Degerlendirmeler (Legal Statement about the Dress Code in Higher Education Institutions)." Online at: www.yok.gov.tr. YOK, supervised by the Ministry of Education, administers Turkey's universities directly.
43. Yavuz and Esposito, *Turkish Islam*, 37.
44. Andrew Davison, *Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey: A Hermeneutic Reconsideration* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 53.
45. Simon Bromley, as quoted in *ibid.*, 135.
46. Mehmet Ozay, *Islamic Identity and Development: Studies of the Islamic Periphery* (London: Routledge, 1990), 8.
47. Arat, "Islamist Women." Arat acknowledges that "by banning headcovering, the state is authoritatively imposing its own understanding of women's liberties on a group who does not share the same understanding" and "banning the headcover is an illiberal act exercised on an illiberal community..." Yet, she still justifies the HBP as the only remedy to control the religious resurgence.
48. *Ibid.*
49. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 6.

50. Yavuz and Esposito, *Turkish Islam*, 6. In his *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (p. 6), Yavuz states that the Islamic social movements in Turkey are “modern and progressive ... with yearnings for democracy and economic development.” For more information about the peaceful and democratic nature of the Islamic identity in Turkey, see Nilufer Gole, *The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996) and Serif Mardin, “Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey,” in *Islam in the Political Process*, ed. James P. Piscatori (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
51. Ali Carkoglu and Binnaz Toprak, *Turkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset* (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2000).
52. Arat, “Islamist Women.”
53. Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, “Citizenship and Equality: The Place for Toleration,” *Political Theory* 21, no. 4. (Nov. 1993): 602.
54. Ozdalga, *The Veiling Issue*, 93.
55. Ibid.
56. Yavuz, “Cleansing Islam,” 38.