

Some Reflections on the Institutions of Muslim Spain: Unity in Politics and Administration (711-929)

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Abstract

This essay analyzes the major political, military, and administrative institutions of al-Andalus (Muslim Spain) and explains how they gave a sense of unity to the Abode of Islam (*dar al-Islam*) by replicating the same institutions used in the East (al-Mashriq). The military institutions (e.g., *jund*, *thughur*, and *husun*) helped to keep Muslim Spain safe from enemy attacks, both Christian and Muslim, and to suppress all revolts, while the political institutions enabled the authorities to keep al-Andalus unified, levy taxes, administer the cities (*sahib al-madinah*), supervise the markets (*sahib al-suq*), and, finally, to administer the region's provinces (*kuwar*).

During the early Middle Ages, the Iberian Peninsula witnessed the invasion and settlement of several different ethnic groups, mainly from other areas of Europe. The Hispano-Romans and the Jews who were living in the Iberian Peninsula at that time faced the Visigoths, the Vandals, and the Suevians (Swabians), who invaded Spain during the fifth and the sixth centuries. The Visigoths managed to control most of the peninsula and founded a strong kingdom in present-day Spain that lasted for about two centuries.¹

The Visigoths, like the other Germanic peoples who spread over the territories of the falling Roman Empire, converted to Christianity, first

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adopting Arianism and, later on, Roman Catholicism. In their Iberian kingdom, the Visigoths, who were a minority, ruled over a largely Hispano-Roman majority. Their law favored them and discriminated against the Romans and other groups. A major change in the Visigothic kingdom took place in 589, when King Recaredo converted from Arianism to Roman Catholicism and took all of his people with him. For the Visigoths, Roman Catholicism became the major element of cultural unity and led them to forge an alliance with the Pope against the Arians and non-Christian groups, mainly the Jews.² The Germanic peoples now incorporated Roman law and culture, both of which they admired, into their own culture by accepting Rome's spiritual leadership.

Early in the eighth century, these Visigoths faced a powerful Arab invasion that destroyed their kingdom and brought new ethnic elements into the peninsula, as well as the new religion of Islam.³ The Visigoths portrayed Islam as an enemy religion and the major ideology confronting Christianity, since this new faith expanded throughout such traditional Christian territories as Egypt, Syria, Palestine, and the Iberian Peninsula. Hence, opposition and clashes between the two cultures arose.

This essay studies the political, military organization, and administration of the Muslim emirate on the Iberian Peninsula from 711 to 929, from the Muslim conquest to the declaration of the caliphate. Special emphasis will be placed on the political, military, and administrative institutions that the Muslims developed in al-Andalus, in close relation with parallel institutions in the East. This essay will also keep in mind that religion was the major reason for social stratification, both in Visigothic and Islamic Spain, and will portray religion as an element of social differences when dealing with the peninsula's social realities.

The study of these complex institutions will allow us to look at the state's configuration and role; the politics of the time; and the hierarchy, origins, evolution, and changes of the elite in al-Andalus in the period under investigation. In order to set the context, this essay first provides some information concerning the land; that is, a general description of the region's geography, rivers, lands, and products. Finally, by analyzing these administrative institutions, it is possible to visualize a major framework in which a unity was realized in the administration, bureaucracy, army, and *thughur* (frontier areas) all over the Abode of Islam.

Even though the analysis of the emirate's diverse ethnic groups and social classes is also relevant, such issues are beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice it to say that such studies show the various ways of achieving social

mobility and lead toward an understanding of the cultural values and attitudes in the society under discussion. In the case of al-Andalus, we notice that patronage, connections, education, wealth, abilities, artistic skills, and participation in the army or the political administration contributed to the rise of people of different social backgrounds to leading positions.

In researching this society, one also has to deal with the politics of the time, the administrative institutions, and the role of the Muslim elite in al-Andalus. The elite was an open group, although not for everybody, because social mobility was possible. Studying the elite helps us to understand that there were some exceptions in the emirate's societal roles. For example, some Christians and Jews rose to leading positions in a society in which adhering to Islam was expected for social mobility of anyone occupying an administrative position. However, a detailed study of these issues also is beyond the scope of this essay. Here, only general statements are made in this respect, since these themes have been developed in detail in previous articles.⁴ The same is also true when dealing with the various ethnic groups. Suffice it to say that each ethnic group contained social differences as well as tribal, clan, and family rivalries.

Politicians and administrators were essential for the emirate's unity. Through a specific analysis of Muslim society and the politics of al-Andalus, one acquires a clear understanding of its variety, continuity, and change. On the whole, the ruling Muslim elite's political conquest and control of al-Andalus, as well as its prevailing Islamic culture and institutions, provided unity. One can see in this period a politically unified territory that, beneath the surface, nevertheless had many divisions – mainly social, religious, and ethnic. This important point must be kept in mind, for these divisions caused social tension and eventually manifested themselves as violent revolts. This was also true for the eastern parts of Dar al-Islam.

The Land

“Al-Andalus resembled God's Paradise,” according to the historian al-Razi. This became a common description of the Iberian Peninsula, one that was repeated by numerous writers in subsequent centuries.⁵ The peninsula was described in medieval sources, both historical and geographical, as a rich land with abundant water, mountains, a variety of agricultural products, as well as being rich in minerals and having a healthy atmosphere.⁶ Some legends surrounding its conquest even

emphasize the idea that the Muslim armies, led by Tariq ibn Ziyad and later by Musa ibn Nusayr, were persuaded to cross the Strait of Gibraltar to conquer these rich agricultural lands and all of their treasures after hearing the detailed descriptions of Count Julián.⁷

In almost all of the geographical descriptions of al-Andalus, the geographers and travelers depict it as a triangle⁸ located in an excellent climate: High mountains towered over it, and its fertile valleys produced a great variety of crops. The major rivers, namely, the Ebro, Duero, Tajo, Guadalquivir, and Guadiana, provided the water that irrigated the valleys and made a bounteous agricultural production possible.⁹ People had settled along these rivers since ancient times. The Muslims preserved these cities and also established new ones in these valleys. These new cities followed the same planned patterns that characterized Muslim cities in the east of Dar al-Islam.

Despite the existence of so many large cities (e.g., Córdoba, Sevilla, Toledo, and Zaragoza), the population of al-Andalus during the Muslim presence was mainly agricultural. The majority of the people lived in rural areas and devoted their efforts to agricultural production and cattle-raising. People were taxed according to Islamic law. However, due to the existence of two different agricultural systems or techniques, dry farming and irrigated farming, Muslim legislators debated the amount of taxes that should be collected, the differences between them, and how these differences should be treated fairly by the law. The taxes collected from irrigated lands were lower, according to the law, than those collected from the dry farms, in order to compensate for the major effort and additional work of the cultivator, who had to irrigate his lands in order to produce.¹⁰

Over the centuries, the capital city of Córdoba experienced a population increase. It has been calculated that it rose from approximately 25,000 inhabitants during the time of `Abd al-Rahman I (756-788), to 75,000 during that of `Abd al-Rahman II (822-852), and to 100,000 (or more likely to 90,000) in the time of `Abd al-Rahman III (912-961) at the beginning of the caliphate.¹¹ Along with the emirate's capital, many other cities also experienced a population increase during the Muslim presence, among them Sevilla, Málaga, Granada, Toledo, and Zaragoza.¹²

The landscape, temperatures, and precipitation, not to mention the ecology in general, differ between the southern and northern regions of the Iberian Peninsula. There are clearly two zones: "dry" and "wet." The southern regions are mainly "dry" areas with higher temperatures than the "wet" regions of the north. The areas closer to the Mediterranean are drier and

warmer than those in the north.¹³ These facts contributed to the peninsula's separation into two different, although interrelated, ecological systems. Likewise, the two zones' agriculture, animal husbandry, and arboriculture were also different, although the geographers related that they complemented each other.¹⁴

During the Middle Ages, the movement of populations, the immigration of settlers, the occupation of new lands, the adoption of new agricultural techniques, and the introduction of new crops brought significant changes into the environment. The Arab conquest of the peninsula likewise introduced many changes in agriculture. What was just sheep herding in Roman times now became full-scale ranching. Irrigation, an important technical innovation, made it possible to introduce such new crops as rice and sugar cane, which literally changed the landscape of the Iberian Peninsula during the Muslim presence. Native populations, especially those in the northern areas, began to imitate some of the new techniques and thereby introduced some of the new crops and successfully integrated the new ways of the Arabs.

The major differences in the agricultural production and techniques between the north and the south – that is, between the “wet” and the “dry” areas – is represented by the fact that the Muslims introduced complementary activities and agricultural production. For example, such typical produce found in Mediterranean climates, among them grapes, olives, and irrigated cereal production, appeared in the south. In the north, by contrast, cereal production was more important and played a much more significant role than it did in the south. The Muslim presence provoked dramatic changes, to the point that the south was orientalized through the introduction of such Syrian landscape characteristics as agricultural systems, Syrian hydraulic machinery, Syrian building techniques, and decorative motifs. People from the mountainous northern areas who moved south and settled in the plains were acculturated into using the agricultural and irrigation techniques, as well as other Mediterranean patterns introduced by Muslims.¹⁵

Over the centuries, the major products of al-Andalus were cereals, bread, honey, beeswax, sugar, silk, saffron, olive oil, such vegetables as carrots and lettuce, such fruits as figs, oranges and other citrus fruits, apricots and grapes. These products made it possible for the local inhabitants to have a balanced diet, despite the fact that not all of these products were introduced into the peninsula at the same time. For example, citrus fruits arrived much later than rice or sugar.¹⁶ However, it is important to remem-

ber that some of these products came from the east to the west, were introduced by the Muslims into Iberia, and gradually caused a real Arab “Green Revolution.”¹⁷ In addition to these economic changes, the Arabs also brought social, political, and administrative transformations.

Muslim Political Institutions and Administration

After the rapid expansion and conquest of al-Andalus, Muslims brought a great number of institutions that were already established in the East. These new institutions, ranging from social and economic to religious and cultural, gave special characteristics to the Iberian Peninsula. This section analyzes how some of the major institutions, which lasted for several centuries and left a mark on post-Muslim Spanish culture, contributed to the diffusion of specific aspects of Muslim culture which promoted cultural continuity in a period of great social, cultural, economic, and political transformation.

Particular attention is paid to the political and administrative institutions that the Muslims spread throughout the peninsula during 711-929 as a way to understand the politics of the time, the role of the ruler and his governors, and the dynamics of this society, which continually revolted during the period of the emirate for a wide variety of political, economic, social, and cultural reasons. Some of these institutions, mainly the military ones, were developed to meet these challenges facing the state's structure.

Political and Administrative Institutions

Arab domination of the peninsula brought rapid transformation to the political institutions devised by the Visigoths and the Hispano-Romans. The major political transformation came when the Muslims deposed the Visigothic monarchy and replaced it with the emirate system then in use in Muslim lands. The emirate in al-Andalus became an administrative unit with a local Arab ruler who was loyal to the Umayyad caliph in Damascus. The fact that the Umayyad caliph's name was mentioned in khutbahs in al-Andalus proves their loyalty (*bay`ah*) to the person then considered as the *amir al-mu`minin*. The emirate's independence from the Damascus caliphs occurred a few years later, after the `Abbasids took over, dethroned, and then killed most members of the Umayyad family. However, `Abd al-Rahman ibn Mu`awiya al-Dakhil, a surviving member of the Umayyad royal family, made his way to al-Andalus. After obtaining the region's *bay`ah*, he separated al-Andalus from the rest of Dar al-

Islam, thereby making it an independent emirate. At least in theory, Muslims recognized the caliph in Baghdad, the new `Abbasid capital, as the true *khalifah* (*amir al-mu'minin*), for some time, although the sources provided different and even contradictory information on this.¹⁸

POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES. Once the Muslim political system was established in al-Andalus, several institutions and administrative offices were also developed. The emirate's political system evolved over time, and major transformations occurred. These changes show that the political system was dynamic and not monolithic. However, the sources do not shed enough light upon the political system's organization or on the various political administrators' roles and participation. Some sources provide the titles of the office of a functionary, but very rarely explain his job. Not even such late sources as Ibn Khaldun's *Al-Muqaddimah* or his *Kitab al-'Ibar* contain the necessary information to address these issues in detail. In order to provide a satisfactory explanation, one has to keep in mind the sources' limitations and try to describe the emirate's political system and understand the role played by the central government.

Although other administrative positions were also important as part of a centralized administration, they were always, with some exceptions, subordinated to the central power. It is also important to bear in mind that Muslims in the Iberian Peninsula imposed the same political institutions that prevailed in the eastern part of Dar al-Islam, namely, many of the institutions that their eastern counterparts had copied from the Persians, a fact clearly revealed by their failure to emulate any Visigothic institutions. This development gave a sense of unity to the institutions that the Muslims developed all over Dar al-Islam.

The major characteristic of the emirate's political system was that power was concentrated, as in the East, in the hands of the ruler, who had absolute authority. This leads us to discuss the issue of legitimacy, which has been addressed so much throughout the entire history of Dar al-Islam. Once legitimacy was obtained, the ruler controlled all the reins of power, appointed his supporters to administrative positions in the provinces, and had direct administrative power over the entire emirate.

In al-Andalus, the Islamic concept of sovereignty was considered to reside with Allah, as was the case in the East. Allah then delegated it to the Muslim community, which, in turn, elected its representatives. However, to a certain extent and with some limitations, this democratic system was practiced only during the time of the Rashidun caliphs (632-61), for once the dynastic system was organized and imposed, beginning

with the Umayyads, it became the political organization in all of the lands of Islam. In the East, a dynasty claimed all legitimacy, and the same process also held sway in the Maghrib and al-Andalus.

As in the East, many changes occurred after the Umayyads, who were more traditional in matters related to the Arab administrative process and relations with the people, were defeated by the `Abbasids, who transformed the relationship of the ruler (caliph) with the people in order to conform more closely to the Persian tradition. The ruler started hiding from the people and lessened his public appearances, thereby weakening his close relationship with the general public (*`amma*). The caliph directed the Friday prayer in the mosque as imam and, other than that, was rarely seen in public. Later Muslim historians also reported that the Umayyad caliphs had been seen in public more often and had had a more direct relationship with the common people.¹⁹

This also occurred in al-Andalus. While the *umara'* (rulers; sing. *amir*) were often seen in public, in the court, and leading the Friday prayer, the Umayyad caliphs of al-Andalus were much more distant from the public. Arabic sources explain that this process started earlier with amir `Abd Allah (888-912) even before `Abd al-Rahman III declared himself *amir al-mu'minin* in Córdoba.

The *umara'* were autocrats who had absolute power. In general terms, the *amir* was entrusted with maintaining order in the emirate, applying Islamic law (Shari`ah) according to the strict Maliki school (he was the last court of appeal), and leading the Muslim community according to the traditional Islamic practices of ordering the good (*ma`ruf*) and prohibiting the evil (*munkar*). All decisions were in his hands. Despite the delegation of some functions to loyal functionaries, all of them were directly responsible to him. The ruler could dismiss any assistant at his own discretion and without any appeal. The *amir* in al-Andalus, as was the case in the East, had the right of life and death, and his name was mentioned in the Friday *khutba* for all to recognize his authority. He also minted coins with his name on them, and spent money from the public treasury at his own discretion. His power and decisions could not be limited, except by the relevant provisions contained in the Shari`ah, whose application he supervised. No one could defy him, criticize his behavior or orders, or the way public funds were spent. In return, the people expected a just system, the correct and just application of the law, and a state free of oppression (*zulm*).

For an efficient political system and for the effective defense of the realm, the ruler also concentrated all military decisions in his hands. In

his capacity as commander-in-chief of the army, he was obligated to defend al-Andalus from any possible enemy attacks, whether by another Muslim state or the Christian kingdoms. The *amir* also organized the summer campaigns (*sa'ifa*, from whence the Spanish word *aceifa*) to attack the Christian kingdoms in the north. Another one of his many tasks was to supervise the equal sharing of war booty.

The ruler also directed foreign policy. He sent ambassadors to Muslim or Christian kingdoms (Christians and Jews often served as his ambassadors) and also received foreign ambassadors at his court. He accepted presents sent to him by other rulers and sent gifts to them.

TAXES. The ruler alone had the power to collect taxes from his people and extract tribute from his defeated enemies. He followed the Muslim system of taxation (*kharaj*) and taxed land, commerce, the works of artisans and any other industrial occupations, as well as the *jizya* (a poll-tax on members of the Ahl al-Kitab who remained in the lands of Islam and were treated according to the *dhimma* system). This gave a sense of unity in the Dar al-Islam, both in the East and in the West.²⁰

To these commonly established taxes, one has to add special contributions requested from time to time for particular purposes, such as the *kharaj al-sur* (for protection and for constructing the walls of a city or a village), the *farda* (for military vigilance along the coasts), along with the import-export taxes, one of the major ones being the *al-qabala*, and the tax levied on all beasts of burden (*dariba*). Another tax was the *nazila*, which was paid in currency for the right of lodging. Ibn Hazm even mentioned a tax on wine. There was also the *taqwiya*, a tax popularized after the tenth century, that was paid only once in a lifetime to equip and maintain a soldier.²¹ To these taxes must be added the fines imposed by the rulers²² as punishment for various wrong-doings.²³ Another major source of income was the state's monopoly on minting coins (*sikka*), which generated considerable benefits.²⁴

THE BUREAUCRACY. The most important administrative office was the *hajib*, which was similar to the *wazir* in the East.²⁵ The *hajib* led some of the *sawa'if*. This was one of his tasks mainly in the time of the *umara'*. Over the years, this position gained great importance and admiration. Several *umara'* did not have a permanent *hajib*. Lévi-Provençal has proven that in the time of *amir* `Abd Allah, after his second *hajib* died, this important post remained empty and was not filled until the time of `Abd al-Rahman III. The first caliph of al-Andalus had two *hajibs*, the first one being Badr ibn Musa and then Musa ibn Hudayr. However, when

the second one died in 320/932, the caliph did not appoint anyone in this position until the very end of his rule.²⁶

In order for the emirate's political and administrative system to be efficient, it was necessary to count on a reliable bureaucracy of good and trustworthy functionaries. Both in the time of the *umara'* and in the period of the caliphate, the ruler appointed a great number of functionaries to govern the cities and the provinces in his name, collect taxes, control and distribute what the region produced, supervise prices and measures, punish delinquents, apply the Shari'ah properly, distribute water, defend the emirate's frontiers, deal with official correspondence, and many other such activities. The bureaucracy, like other bureaucracies of the time, was slow and very detailed in administrative matters. It was also hierarchically organized among palace dignitaries or major functionaries. During the time of the *umara'*, the most important offices were located in the palace.²⁷

The *kitabā* (secretary of state) was the major administrative office and was therefore located in the palace. It had two main offices: the *katib al-rasa'il* (the supervisor of the official correspondence) and the *katib al-zimam* (the functionary in charge of administering public funds). This latter functionary also was called the *sahib al-ashghal al-kharajiyah*. It is not difficult to imagine how important this office was for the emirate's good administration and progress.

The *katib al-rasa'il*, also known as the *sahib al-rasa'il*, had many responsibilities and functions. To compensate for his hard work, he was granted numerous privileges. This *wazir* was usually a palace dignitary, a person with a great influence and power, and one who was always very close to the ruler. In time, this *wazir* collected so many responsibilities that by the time of `Abd al-Rahman III, when al-Andalus reached its peak, the caliph was forced to reform this office in order to make it more efficient and to make it function properly. The caliph probably realized the danger of having such a powerful functionary in his administration.²⁸

The *umara'* always had a personal secretary (*katib khass*) to whom he dictated his decisions, which were to be transmitted to his functionaries throughout the emirate. This personal secretary only wrote drafts of the ruler's orders, which were written later on in proper court language and style. Among this bureaucrat's major documents were the ruler's orders for various functionaries, the collection of taxes with the proper information about dates and amounts collected, and the ruler's appointment of new functionaries. The court also expected the various functionaries to send their reports to the ruler using the appropriate paper and ink.²⁹

This administrative organization was the work of the Umayyads on the Iberian Peninsula. It lived on even after the Umayyads no longer ruled the area, during the Ta'ifah period. The Almoravids, and later on the Almohads, copied some of these public administration institutions and introduced some reforms, as has been demonstrated elsewhere.³⁰ Again, these institutions provide a sense of the Muslim administration's unity throughout the empire. This system of chancellery, as well as the writing of letters and reports to the court, was preserved throughout the Muslim presence on the Iberian Peninsula, until the Nazrid dynasty of Granada. This shows the continuity of some of the important offices for an efficient administration.³¹

Several other important offices for administering various activities were also common in the administration of the East. Very soon, they made their way to al-Andalus. Among them were the *sahib al-shurta* (chief of police), who was entrusted with preserving order and punishing wrong-doers. The *sahib al-shurta* was also in charge of levying fines. The *sahib al-madinah* (from whence the Spanish word *zalmedina*: inspector of the city) performed many functions: ensuring the state's security and public order, serving as commander of the army for the *ghazat*, governing in the caliph's absence, and proclaiming and crowning the *umara'* and caliphs (receiving the *bay'ah* for the ruler). The *sahib al-madinah* was frequently also in charge of levying taxes. The *sahib al-suq* (inspector of the market), who dealt with prices, weights, and quality of the products in the markets, also was in charge of punishing those who did not follow the required qualities, weights, or measures for the products, as established by the law. For this, he counted on his own militia. These regulations are contained in the treatises of *hisba*, both in the East and al-Andalus. Other officials were the *sahib al-saqiya* (inspector of irrigation and water supplies) and the *sahib al-diya'* (inspector of the villages).³²

THE SYSTEM OF COMMUNICATION. For the good and fast diffusion of the rulers' decisions, it was necessary to establish an efficient mail system. This rapid communication system (*barid*) reached all places in the emirate and rapidly brought any information concerning potential dangers in the *thughur* (frontier regions) to the court's attention. Upon the rapid arrival of news, the ruler made his best decisions. In the East, the *barid* system was quite efficient. Both the Umayyads and the `Abbasids gave special attention to these communications so that all of their orders would reach their destinations, and in order to keep an eye on any possible trouble-makers. Therefore, it was also an important defense measure

for the empire. The `Abbasids were intent upon protecting the *barid* routes with strong guards. As in the East, in al-Andalus the *barid* helped maintain an efficient and reliable administration, even though the sources contain only scarce information on this subject. The sources also explain that a number of Sudanese blacks were employed in this activity as *raqqas*, since they had the reputation of being able to walk and run for long distances without any problems.

To improve communications, from the eleventh century on, pigeons were also used to send messages. Despite this new practice, the *barid* was kept as the most relevant and efficient system of communication. This is why the *sahib al-barid* was always an important and influential functionary. The continuation of this institution and the ways used to improve it throughout the centuries gave al-Andalus unity and continuity.

Political Divisions and Provincial Administration

After the Muslim conquest of al-Andalus, the leaders of this new province, as in the East, differentiated between the military administration and the civil control of the territory. Muslims in the Iberian Peninsula also established the military control and administration of the frontiers in order to preserve those lands for the empire.³³

The Umayyad conquest of al-Andalus (756) pointed out for this family the weakness of the administration and the need to reorganize for a better defense. As soon as `Abd al-Rahman I al-Dakhil took power and controlled the whole territory of al-Andalus, he established a firm administration, instituted a more centralized system, and organized a better army. Proof of these changes is that the `Abbasids could not defeat their enemies in the Iberian Peninsula, even though several secret missions were sent to kill the Umayyad *umara'* and return this province to `Abbasid control.

The Umayyads struggled to control the whole Iberian Peninsula and to stop the various revolts that took place in the time of the *umara'*. After the Umayyads controlled the revolt of `Umar ibn Hafsun and his sons in Bobastro (880-928) in the time of `Abd al-Rahman III, and managed to regain other important southern regions and subdue all insurrections by local Arab, Berber, or Muwallad leaders, they restored the political administration of the peninsula to what it had been at the dynasty's beginning. In this way, the majority of al-Andalus was under a civil administration, while the *thughur* (the Marches, the frontier zones) were still under military control.

For political and administrative purposes, al-Andalus was divided into regions or provinces. The Muslims followed the same divisions created by the Visigoths, based upon their ecclesiastical divisions,³⁴ provinces-ducatés, and provinces-counties. The Arabic term used to designate those regions was *kura* (from whence the Spanish word *cora*), which seems to have been of Greek origin. The *kura* (pl. *kuwar*) was a territorial division. The *iqlim*, literally climate, was a minor administrative unit, that is, a district of the *kura*,³⁵ and the *jaz'* (pl. *juzu'*) was the rural administrative division devoted to livestock.³⁶

Arabic sources contain scarce and often confusing information on al-Andalus' political and administrative divisions. The geographers provide different information according to their own perceptions. Al-Maqdisi, for example, mentioned 18 *kuwar* and even asserted that this list was imprecise and incomplete. Yaqut increased the number to 41 *kuwar*.³⁷ Modern research has counted 21 *kuwar*, without counting the *thughur*, after a detailed and valuable research into the works by Ibn al-Faradi and Ibn Bashkuwal.³⁸ However, when listed, there were more than 21 provinces: Córdoba, Fahs al-Ballut (Llano de los Pedrechones), Cabra, Ecija, Sevilla, Carmona, Niebla, Ocsonoba, Beja, Morón, Sidona, Algeciras, Takurunna, Málaga, Elvira, Jaén, Pechina, Tudmir, Játiva, Valencia, Toledo, Santaver, and probably also the Balearic Islands, as well as the regions of Mérida, Badajoz, Santarén, and Lisboa.

Every *kura* had a governor (*wali*; pl. *wulla*), as he was also named in the East. This functionary represented the leader of the Umayyad family in the province, and had the trust of the *amir* or the caliph for administering the *kura*. The *wali* was in charge of keeping his province quiet and under the control of the authorities. He also represented the ruler of al-Andalus in leading the Friday prayer and had all of the important offices that the ruler had in Córdoba, but on a more limited and smaller scale. The following offices were essential for administering the *kura*: one office each for official correspondence, fiscal and other administrative tax-related issues, and collecting and distributing taxes and treasures. There were also officials in charge of evaluating the production and harvests, and of keeping the books.

The *wali* lived and had primary offices in the *qaṣaba* (from whence the Spanish word *alcazaba*). All expenses were covered by the money collected from the people in the *kura*: legal taxes as well as extraordinary contributions, fines, and any other special decisions made by the *wali*. The money collected from every *kura* was supposed to meet the expected mil-

itary expenses related to soldiers, defending the frontiers in the numerous fortresses (Arabic *al-qal`a*, Spanish *alcalá*, among the many Arabic words used to refer to a fortified place) spread all over the frontiers, and the *mar`iya* (from whence the Spanish word *Almería*), or towers for vigilance located on the coast. The rest of the money and wealth collected in the *kuwar* was sent, along with a well-equipped guard, to the royal treasury in Córdoba.

To avoid any *wali* from becoming too powerful and challenging the central authority and proclaiming himself independent, the *umara`* frequently dismissed those who were becoming too strong from their positions. In addition, due to corruption, on certain occasions the *umara`* removed some *wulla* from their positions as well, or because a functionary of a *kura* enriched himself very rapidly, probably from the public money. Another major reason for dismissing a *wali* was because of his abuse of power vis-à-vis the local population. However, officials in certain territories located relatively far away from the capital managed to evade central control and to continue abusing their power. The cases of Toledo and Valencia are especially germane in this context.

Military Institutions: The *Thughur* and the Army

Muslims in al-Andalus were well aware that the emirate's military needs had to be met in order to administer its political and economic affairs in an efficient manner. They also knew of the constant political dangers from which the emirate suffered from the Christian kingdoms in the northern regions, from the Franks, and, later on, from the Fatimids of North Africa. Since the very beginning of their presence on the Iberian Peninsula, Muslims organized various military institutions with this purpose in mind.

The first "march" system of *thughur* (sing. *thaghr*) was that of the Muslims in the frontier lands of the Byzantine Empire, where there was a constant military alert. Muslims brought the same system to the Iberian Peninsula. The *thughur* in al-Andalus were also war zones (*dar al-harb*), where a constant alert was kept as well. Despite the fact that these marches were located in the frontier lands, they were not uninhabited territories. Rather, the *thughur* were strategically located, usually following the natural frontiers of rivers or mountainous regions. Behind these fortified frontiers were rich agricultural lands and usually highly populated areas. However, because they had a military mission to protect

the empire and provide the first line of defense against the enemy, they also had a different organization and qualifications. In short, they were military territories under the administrative system of al-Andalus. As these regions were remote from the capital of the nearest province and from Córdoba, the authority in these military regions was, according to the *amir's* decision and delegation, a military leader (*qa'id*) instead of a civil governor (*wali*).

As one can expect from a frontier that continued to shift due to constant wars, the advance of enemy armies, and various attacks, the marches also moved throughout the centuries of Muslim presence in al-Andalus. According to the Arabic sources, there were three *thughur*: the superior, the middle, and the inferior. However, during the time of the caliphate, the marches were reduced to two groups: *al-thaghr al-a`la* or *al-aqsá* (the superior or the remotest march) with its capital in Zaragoza, and *al-thaghr al-awsat* or *al-adnā* (the middle or nearest march), located in Medinaceli to face any possible attack from Castilla or León. In the time of Caliph `Abd al-Rahman al-Nasir, Medinaceli replaced Toledo, because the latter had become a remote zone in which military actions were occurring.³⁹

To help defend Muslim territories and protect the frontiers, the Umayyads built a great number of towers (*burj*, pl. *buruj*), castles (*qal`a*, pl. *qilā`*), and fortresses (*hisn*, pl. *husun*) all along the *thughur* territories. The immense number of fortresses have become a characteristic of the Spanish landscape, as well as the reason for the toponyms of vast regions and a great number of places all over the Iberian Peninsula. As witnesses to al-Andalus' military past, these fortresses show the need that existed then for defense and attacks on both sides, Muslim and Christian. These numerous fortified places were always located in strategic places, usually on top of an inaccessible mountain, and strongly protected with a solid door, a ditch (*khandaq*)⁴⁰ and a wall – all elements of medieval military strategy. These fortified places were essential to the military control of areas, for the defense of the state against its enemies, and important to the rebels as well, for the survival of their movements in defense of their own interests.

The army, which was essential for preserving the emirate's political unity and defense, consisted of two elements. The first was the people drafted from all of the emirates' provinces. Undoubtedly, for many people living in the Iberian Peninsula during the Muslim presence, the army constituted a way to improve one's social status. Besides, the chance to share booty in any new conquests or *sāwa`if* also appealed to many. The second group was the mercenaries, usually foreigners,⁴¹ who at times

formed a considerable component of the army. To these two groups one has to add the people drafted in times of extraordinary need in order to reinforce the army ready to face the enemy or for a jihad against the Christians.

The various Arabic sources contain only sparse information when it comes to dealing with particular issues about the army, the social origin of the people drafted, and the stipends (*`ata'* given in exchange for their military services. What the sources mention constantly is that the soldiers (*jund*, pl. *junud*) became one of the major groups to be drafted into the army. They arrived as soldiers and were considered such. The *junud* of Balj settled in this way in the Iberian Peninsula: the *junud* of Damascus settled in Elvira, the *junud* of Jordan in Rayya, the *junud* of Palestine in Sidona, the *junud* of Emesa in Niebla and Sevilla, the *junud* of Qinnasrin in Jaén, and the *junud* of Egypt in Beja, Ocsonoba (Algarve), and in Tudmir (Murcia). Since the *junud* settled in these *kuwar*, these provinces were called *mujannada*; that is, that they had the special status of *junud*.⁴²

The *junud* formed a military force that was ready whenever the ruler asked them to defend the frontiers or for any other military action. According to tradition and arrangements, they were not to be paid because of the land grants that they had received. However, this situation changed, and very soon the Syrian *junud* were paid both in currency and in livestock for their military participation in any campaign. By the tenth century, the term *junud* did not only include the descendants of the famous Syrian soldiers, but also encompassed many other people of various ethnic origins, such as Arabs, Berbers, Muwalladun, and almost anyone free and old enough for military service.

When the *amir* started to prepare for a campaign, men from all of the *kuwar* were drafted to serve as soldiers. The *wali* of every *kura* had the responsibility to send the soldiers who were already listed in the *kura's diwan* to the capital of al-Andalus, or to the place that the ruler had assigned them in advance. Volunteers were also welcome for any expedition. Many people voluntarily participated in military campaigns as a way to increase their income, elevate their social status, and, if a triumph was in the offing, obtain a share of the spoils (*anfāl*) of war.⁴³ Another important group of volunteers consisted of those people who enrolled to fight the enemies of Islam on the Iberian Peninsula. Many came from various parts of al-Andalus to participate in the campaigns against Christians in these lands, which they asserted belonged to Dar al-Islam.

There were also some foreigners, especially from the Maghrib, who eagerly participated in these wars. Due to the singular religious character of these peoples, they were usually called Ahl al-Ribat, due to the possibility they had to be part of the religious armies in the border garrisons, and combine military practices with spiritual or mystical exercises.⁴⁴ These volunteers could not receive a military stipend, since they were *mutatawwi`a*, literally volunteers. However, they were allowed a share in the distribution of the booty captured from the Christians.⁴⁵

The Umayyads also used mercenaries to defend the emirate's frontiers, as well as in the *sawa'if* or *ghazawat* against local rebels or the Christian kingdoms. Some rebels, for example `Umar ibn Hafsun, also had mercenaries in their armies. To hire mercenaries was a common practice in Europe and the East during the Middle Ages. For al-Andalus, the term used to designate a group of foreign mercenary soldiers was *hasham*, in contrast to *junud*, which referred to the soldiers drafted from among the inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula. The *hasham* were soldiers of foreign origin, whether they were African blacks or European whites. The latter group was called the Saqaliba.⁴⁶

According to some Arabic sources, mainly the works by Ibn Hayyan, Ibn `Idhari, al-Nuwairi, Ibn al-Athir, Ibn Khaldun, and al-Maqqari, *amir* al-Hakam I (796-822) was the first to introduce the practice of hiring foreign mercenaries. However, according to some passages found in other Arabic sources, mainly the *Akhbar Majmu`a*, even *amir* `Abd al-Rahman I and *amir* Hisham I (788-96) had personal paid armies of foreigners. However, as has been shown elsewhere, al-Hakam I was the first ruler to organize a permanent army of mercenaries.⁴⁷

The sources also mention that in addition to organizing an army of foreign mercenaries, *amir* al-Hakam I also reorganized the regular troops and made important changes in order to have a more efficient army to defend the Muslim dominions of the Iberian Peninsula and to attack the Christians during the *sawa'if*. Al-Hakam I also established permanent armies and equipped them as best as he could, set the stipends (*`ata'*) for the permanent soldiers as well as those drafted for particular military activities, founded several arsenals for weapons and other military effects in the emirate's capital and in many other places in al-Andalus, increased the production of military equipment, and established a permanent militia (the *da'ira*) for the court.⁴⁸ An anonymous work affirms that there were 3,000 soldiers in the cavalry and a further 2,000 in the infantry. They were white slaves – the Saqaliba.⁴⁹ In the following years, al-Andalus'

other *umara'* and caliphs always had a personal army of foreign soldiers. Some of them were paid, as in the case of the mercenaries, while others were slaves like the Saqaliba, or the Slav soldiers.

When one wonders about the size of the armies raised to defend the *thughur* areas and for the numerous *sawa'if* campaigns, one encounters serious deficits in the Arabic sources concerning precise descriptions. The reliability of the figures and descriptions of some of the chronicles dealing with the armies, booty, and treasures further complicates this problem. Muslim medieval chroniclers had a tendency to exaggerate these figures, overemphasize the Muslim leaders' courage, and the quantity of treasure captured. However, one has to be aware of these facts and carefully analyze the information provided by the various chronicles and other works, just as the great Maghribian historian Ibn Khaldun recommended.⁵⁰

After carefully studying the Arabic sources, modern historians have pointed out that the number of the royal army at the time of `Abd al-Rahman III was, at most, between 30,000 to 35,000 soldiers, and that these figures probably doubled during the `Amirid dictatorship of Almanzor.⁵¹ Almanzor's successful drafting of soldiers and mercenaries was probably one of the reasons why his armies were always victorious, despite the legends concerning the events in Calatañazor.

How the army was organized and the orders were received on the battlefield are two important factors in the good performance of an army when facing enemies. In this respect, again the Arabic sources provide hardly any information.⁵² Therefore, these issues cannot be answered definitively. The military descriptions of the army's organization and battle strategies available in the Arabic sources belong to the fourteenth century, a much later period, and are found mainly in the works of Ibn Hudhayl.⁵³ Despite his descriptions, the usefulness of his work remains limited when considering how the army was organized in earlier times. There are still answers missing and numerous unsolved puzzles.

Arabic sources mention several military practices in the Iberian Peninsula that were copied from the East, just as many other eastern institutions were transported to al-Andalus. One of the most common military practices was that the *qa'id* of a *sa'ifa* (a war against enemies or rebels) commanded the war from a tent up on a hill. There are some descriptions of this in Ibn Hayyan's *Al-Muqtabis*, for example, for the campaigns that *amir* `Abd Allah commanded against the rebel `Umar ibn Hafsun.⁵⁴ To lead a war from a hill had been very common in the East since the early days of Islam, as revealed by the Arabic sources.⁵⁵

The Arabic sources contain a few general references, but no detailed descriptions, of how wars were fought or how the leadership was organized and followed in the battlefield. If the sources are silent for the royal armies, they are even quieter about revolts. As a result, many more details about the rebels' armies, weapons, military strategies, and command of their wars are missing. The sources, however, do provide a few brief explanations scattered in the descriptions of the continual wars against the ninth-century rebels. These pieces of information allow us to raise some questions and to analyze a common pattern of military organization and war techniques that seem to have been common at that time. Some strategies were practiced by the rebels before and during the revolt of `Umar ibn Hafsun, undoubtedly the major rebel in ninth-century al-Andalus. The rebels used all available weapons, war techniques, and strategies to attack the central government or to defend themselves inside a fortress, in addition to the common and ancient practice of hit-and-run attacks. This is why any study of the army and the military in al-Andalus has to deal with the rebels who used the same strategies, weapons, and war techniques.

Conclusion

After the Muslim conquest of the Iberian Peninsula, Muslims transported the same political, administrative, and military institutions that they had in the East of Dar al-Islam. All of these institutions gave a sense of unity to the lands of the Muslim empire. The *amir* in al-Andalus was, in a way, a political figure similar to the *amir al-mu'minin* (the caliph) and, from 756 onward, acted independently from the caliphate of Baghdad after `Abd al-Rahman I al-Dakhil separated al-Andalus and made it an independent emirate from the `Abbasids.

Similar to the caliph in Dar al-Islam, the *amir* in al-Andalus was the final authority. He made all political decisions for administering the provinces, appointed all public functionaries, and levied taxes. While he imposed the taxation system, other than fines or special contributions, he also exempted certain regions from some taxes during times of crisis or in cases of need. The *amir* also monopolized the minting of coins and led the armies to defend the emirate through several military institutions, mainly the *husun*, the *thughur*, the *junud*, and the regular army. He also organized the *sawa'if* to defend al-Andalus from any attacks coming from the Christian kingdoms to the north or from the rebels within the emirate's

frontiers. Many rebels challenged the state's structure, among them `Umar ibn Hafsun and his sons, whose revolt lasted from 880 to 928 and brought vast regions in southern al-Andalus under their control.

The *amir* also controlled all religious matters. He defended Islam, was the last source of appeal to the Shari`ah court, and appointed the judges and the *qadi al-Islam* in Córdoba and other major cities. Like the caliph in the East, the *amir* united in his hands the political administration and the religious activities. The situation in al-Andalus became stronger after 929, when `Abd al-Rahman III proclaimed himself caliph and challenged the caliph in Baghdad. He also claimed the leadership of Islam and declared total independence, as revealed in the unfolding political events as well as in the *khutba*, which from that moment on mentioned the name only of the caliph in Córdoba.

Along with the political and administrative institutions explained in this essay, which allowed the rulers to exert strict control of al-Andalus, administer the cities and provinces, and levy taxes, one has to mention the important socioeconomic institution of the *sahib al-suq* (inspector of the market). This institution was developed to control the prices, measures, weights, and other regulations of the markets. The *sahib al-suq* gave a sense of unity to the lands of Islam, since the *kitab al-hisba* (treaties dealing with administering the markets) were quite similar all over the Muslim empire. These regulations for al-Andalus were very detailed. For example, butchers were to refrain from carrying dead animals that were still bleeding to the market, because the blood could stain the customers' clothing. This same regulation applied to the meat in the stores, which was not to leave the stores while bleeding, because of the same reason. The presence of pack animals in the markets was also regulated, and many other activities such as the price and description of the characteristics of the slaves sold in the market and the cooking and selling of prepared food.

Regarding the socioeconomic institutions, Muslims in al-Andalus also applied, as in the East, the *dhimma* system to the religious minorities, mainly Christians and Jews. This institution also gave a sense of unity in the administration of the lands of Islam.

As expected, the military institutions defend the Muslim territories from possible enemy attack. The *thughur* system, which played a relevant role in this area, was brought from the East, where it had long been used to defend the lands of Dar al-Islam from possible Byzantine attack. In al-Andalus, the *thughur* moved throughout the centuries to face new

military threats and to defend the frontiers. As explained above, the frontier zones, where the marches were located, were populated areas that contained rich agricultural lands behind the military fortresses.

With the same idea to defend al-Andalus from possible attack, the authorities counted on the *junud* soldiers, who were similar to the *limitanei* of the late Roman Empire. The *junud* arrived in al-Andalus from various areas in the East: Egypt, Palestine, Damascus, Qinnasrin, and Jordan, and settled in different regions. Besides the *thughur* and the *junud*, the authorities in al-Andalus also counted on the drafting of local men for the permanent army, the size of which changed throughout the centuries. Frequently, volunteers joined the army for particular expeditions and/or military reprisals against specific enemies. From the military perspective, the *amir* also had the numerous fortified places all over al-Andalus: the *husun*, the *qal`a*, the *ma`qil*, the *buruj*, the *tali`a*, the *mar`iya*, and others. Each of them had specific purposes, depending on their location: mountains, coasts, strategic places along the roads, vigilance towers, and elsewhere.

From a domestic point of view, these military institutions also defeated numerous revolts all over al-Andalus throughout the centuries, using the *jund* system, the armies, and the *husun*. But the rebels also used these fortifications, available weapons, strategies, and tactics to challenge the state. Therefore, their resistance was a major threat, mainly during the ninth century, to the Umayyad dynasty of al-Andalus. The rulers eventually managed to defeat all of them, but this was not an easy task.

All in all, the political and administrative institutions kept al-Andalus under a unified and organized system that worked for many centuries. This enabled Muslims to enforce the Shari`ah, levy taxes, keep order in the cities and markets, and also efficiently administer the provinces (*kuwar*).

Notes

1. For more information about the Visigoths in Spain, see E. A. Thompson, *Los Godos de España*, Sp. trans. Javier Faci (Madrid: 1971), passim, esp. 19-104 and 179-248; José Eduardo López Pereira, ed. and Spanish trans. *Crónica Mozárabe del 754* (Zaragoza: 1980), 33-34, 45-47, 53, 57, 63-65, and 69; Thomas W. Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam. A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith* (New York: 1974), 131-32; and Joseph O'Callaghan, *A History of Medieval Spain* (Ithaca and London: 1975), passim, esp. 35-88.
2. For more details about King Recaredo and his conversion to Catholicism, see Thompson, *Godos*, passim, esp. 39, 41, 45. For Visigothic Spain, the role of the Church, and the situation of the Jews living there, see Montgomery

- Watt, *A History of Islamic Spain* (Edinburgh: 1965), 10-13 (*Historia de la España Islámica*, Sp. trans. José Elizalde [Madrid: 1980]); Albert Ehrhard and William Neuss, *Historia de la Iglesia* (Madrid: 1961), vol. 2, passim, esp. 1-51; Thompson, *Godos*, 67-72; Salo Wittmayer Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews* (New York: 1957), 4:27-36, esp. 27-29; and Salo Wittmayer Baron, *Ancient and Medieval Jewish History* (New Jersey: 1972), 89-90.
3. For more details about the conquest of al-Andalus, see *Akhbar Majmu`a*, ed. and Sp. trans. Emilio Lafuente y Alcántara (Madrid: 1867), 6-7; Abu Bakr ibn `Umar ibn al-Qutiya al-Qurtubi, *Ta`rikh Iftitah al-Andalus* (*Historia de la Conquista de España*), ed. and Sp. trans. Julián Ribera (Madrid: 1926): 4-6; Abu Hasan Ahmad Yahya al-Baladhuri, *Futuh al-Buldan*, ed. M. J. de Goeje (Leiden: 1866, 2d ed. Leiden: 1968), 230-35; Abu al-`Abbas Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Maqqari, *Kitab Nafh al-Tib*, ed. Reinhart Dozy and Gustave Dugat (Leiden: 1855-61), vol. 1 (reimpression, Amsterdam, 1967), 156 ff; See also `Abd al-Rahman `Ali al-Hajji, *Al-Ta`rikh al-Andalusi min al-Fath al-Islami hatta Suqut Gharnata* (Baghdad: 1976), 41-128; and Joaquín Vallvé, *Nuevas ideas sobre la conquista árabe de España* (Madrid: 1989), passim. For a different and interesting discussion of the Arab conquest of al-Andalus and the Christian Reconquista, see Pierre Guichard, *Al-Andalus. Estructura Antropológica de una Sociedad Islámica en Occidente* (Barcelona: 1976), 33 ff and O`Callaghan, *A History*, 91-98.
 4. See: Roberto Marín-Guzmán, "Ethnic Groups and Social Classes in Muslim Spain," *Islamic Studies* 30, nos. 1-2 (1991): 37-66; Roberto Marín-Guzmán, "Al-Khassa wa al-`Ammah [La élite y el pueblo común] en la historia social de al-Andalus. Una aproximación al estudio de las clases sociales y la movilidad social en la España Musulmana (711-1090)," *Estudios de Asia y Africa* 34, no. 110 (1999): 483-520; Roberto Marín-Guzmán, "Social and Ethnic Tensions in al-Andalus: The Cases of Ishbiliyah (Sevilla) 276/889-302/914 and Ibirah (Elvira) 276/889-284/897. The role of `Umar Ibn Hafsun," *Islamic Studies* 32, no. 3 (1993): 279-318; Roberto Marín-Guzmán, "La rebelión muladí en al-Andalus y los inicios de la sublevación de `Umar Ibn Hafsun en las épocas de Muhammad I and al-Mundhir (880-888)," *Estudios de Asia y Africa* 33, no. 2, (106), (1998): 233-84; and Roberto Marín-Guzmán, "The Causes of the Revolt of `Umar Ibn Hafsun in al-Andalus (880-928): A Study in Medieval Islamic Social History," *Arabica. Revue d`études Arabes* 42 (1995): 180-221.
 5. Évariste Lévi-Provençal, "La `Description de l`Espagne` d`Ahmad al-Razi, Essai de Reconstitution de l`original Arabe et Traduction française," *Al-Andalus* 17 (1953): 51-108. Numerous writers during the Muslim presence in al-Andalus explained that al-Andalus was paradise, among them geographers, but also historians and poets in different times. For example, the Valencian poet Ibn Khafaja of Alcira (1058-1138), whose poetry describes

al-Andalus as paradise: (quoted in Joaquín Vallvé, *La División Territorial de la España Musulmana* [Madrid: 1986], 169.)

¡Oh habitantes de España qué suerte tenéis:
 agua, sombra, río y árboles;
 El Paraíso eterno solo está en vuestro país;
 si yo pudiese escoger, lo escogería;
 No temáis entrar en el Infierno; pues ello no es posible
 después de haber estado en el Paraíso!

Oh inhabitants of Spain, how lucky you are:
 water, shade, river and trees;
 the eternal Paradise is only in your country;
 if I could choose, I would choose it.
 Do not fear to enter Hell, since that is not possible
 after having been in Paradise!

6. Thomas Glick, *Islamic and Christian Spain in the Early Middle Ages* (Princeton: 1979), 53-54.
7. Abu al-`Abbas Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn `Idhari al-Marrakushi, *Al-Bayan al-Mughrib fi Akhbar al-Andalus wa al-Maghrib*, ed. Évariste Lévi-Provençal (Beirut: n.d.): 2:5-6.
8. Abu `Ubayd al-Bakri, *Jughrafiyat al-Andalus wa Uruba min Kitab al-Masalik wa al-Mamalik*, ed. `Abd al-Rahman `Ali al-Hajji (Beirut: 1968), passim. For similar opinions considering al-Andalus as a triangle, see Razi in Maqqari, *Nafh al-Tib*, 1:128-29; quoted by Vallvé, *División*, 99-100.
9. Vallvé, *División*, passim, esp. 106-17, 125-69; Ahmad ibn `Umar Anas al-`Udhri, *Kitab Tarsi` al-Akhbar wa Tanwi` al-Athar wa al-Bustan fi Ghara`ib al-Buldan wa al-Masalik ila Jami` al-Mamalik*, ed. `Abd al-`Aziz al-Ahwani (Madrid: 1965), 1, for information concerning the rivers in al-Andalus; Muhammad ibn Ayyub ibn Ghalib, *Kitab Farhat al-Anfus*, ed. Lutfi `Abd al-Badi`, in *Majalla Ma`had al-Makhtutat al-`Arabiyya* 1, no. 2 (1955): 276-310, esp. 307-08; and Ibn `Abd al-Mun`im al-Himyari, *Kitab al-Rawd al-Mi`tar fi Khabar al-Aqtar*, ed. Évariste Lévi-Provençal (Cairo: 1937), passim.
10. Glick, *Islamic*, 83.
11. See Leopoldo Torres Balbás, "Extensión y demografía de las ciudades hispanomusulmanas," *Studia Islamica* 3 (1955): 35-39; and Glick, *Islamic*, 113.
12. Torres Balbás, "Extensión y demografía," passim.
13. Glick, *Islamic*, 51-52. Anwar Chejne, *Muslim Spain: Its History and Culture* (Minneapolis: 1974), 138-39.
14. The geographers provide detailed accounts concerning the agricultural production in the various areas of al-Andalus. See, for example, Ibn Ghalib, *Farha*, passim, esp. 282 (for the *kura* of Cabra), 283-84 (for the *kura* of Elvira), 284 (for the *kura* of Jaén), and 284-85 (for the *kura* of Tudmir); Himyari, *Al-Rawd al-Mi`tar*, passim; and Abu `Abd Allah Muhammad al-

- Idrisi, *Al-Maghrib wa Ard al-Sudan wa Misr wa al-Andalus, min Kitab Nuzhat al-Mushtaq fi Ikhtiraq al-Afaq* (Description de l'Afrique et de l'Espagne), ed. and Fr. trans. Reinhart Dozy and M. J. de Goeje (Leiden: 1866 [reprint Amsterdam: 1969]), passim.
15. Glick, *Islamic*, 55 ff.
 16. In Arab literature, besides historical and geographic works, one also finds that Muslims during the Middle Ages had a well-balanced diet. This was subject, obviously, to the family's income. In this respect, see Roberto Marín Guzmán, "La literatura árabe como fuente para la historia social: el caso del Kitab al-Bukhala' de al-Jahiz," *Estudios de Asia y Africa* 28, no. 90 (1993): 32-83; and Roberto Marín Guzmán, *Kitab al-Bukhala' de al-Jahiz. Fuente para la Historia Social del Islam Medieval* (El Colegio de México: 2001), passim.
 17. Glick, *Islamic*, 76-78.
 18. For more information about the *khutba* in al-Andalus and its political implications, see `Ali ibn Ahmad ibn Sa`id ibn Hazm, *Kitab Naqt al-`Arus fi Tawarikh al-Khulafa' bi al-Andalus*, ed. C.F. Seybold, in *Revista del Centro de Estudios Históricos de Granada*, no. 3 (1911): 160-80, no. 4 (1911): 237-48 (reprint Valencia:1974), passim, esp. 75; Abu `Abd Allah Muhammad al-Quda`i ibn al-Abbar, *Kitab al-Hilla al-Sira'*, ed. H. Mu`nis (Cairo: 1963-64), 1:35-36; Maqqari, *Nafh al-Tib* (Cairo: 1949), 4:59 (Egyptian ed.); Abu Marwan `Abd al-Malik ibn al-Kardabus, *Ta`rikh al-Andalus li Ibn al-Kardabus*, ed. Ahmad Mukhtar al-`Abbadi (Madrid: 1971), 61; Muhammad ibn Abi al-Qasim al-Qayrawani (Ibn Abi Dinar), *Kitab al-Mu`nis fi Akhbar Ifriqiyya wa T`nis* (Tunis, 1286 A.H.), 44-45 and 98; Roberto Marín-Guzmán, "Crusade in al-Andalus: The Eleventh Century Formation of the Reconquista as an Ideology," *Islamic Studies* 31, no. 3 (1992): 287-318, esp. 289-90; and Marcelin Defourneaux, *Les français en Espagne aux XIe et XIIe siècles* (Paris: 1949), passim.
 19. See Abu al-`Abbas Ahmad ibn `Ali al-Maqrizi, *Kitab al-Niza` wa al-Takhasum fi ma bayna Bani Umayya wa Bani Hashim*, ed., Von Geerhardus Vos (Leiden: 1888), (Book on Contention and Strife between Banu Umayya and Banu Hashim), Eng. trans. Clifford Bosworth (Manchester: 1980), 92; Roberto Marín-Guzmán, *Popular Dimensions of the `Abbasid Revolution: A Case Study of Medieval Islamic Social History* (Cambridge, MA: 1990), 107 ff.
 20. The Arabic sources refer to the abuses of the authorities toward new Muslims being charged with the *jizya* tax, instead of being exempt as they were supposed to be. See Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari, *Ta`rikh al-Rusul wa al-Muluk*, ed. M. J. de Goeje (Leiden: 1879-1901), 2:1688 (Leiden ed.); Marín-Guzmán, *Popular*, 59-60; and Daniel Dennett, *Conversion and the Poll Tax in Early Islam* (Cambridge, MA: 1950), passim, esp. 24.
 21. Évariste Lévi-Provençal, "España Musulmana, Instituciones y Vida social e Intelectual," in Ramón Menéndez Pidal, *Historia de España* (Madrid:

- 1957), 5:21-22; and Miguel Asín Palacios, "Un Códice Inexplorado del Cordobés Ibn Hazm," *Al-Andalus* 2 (1934), passim, esp. 37.
22. For more information about the quantities collected during various periods of the Muslim presence in al-Andalus, consult, among others, Al-Bakri, *Al-Masalik wa al-Mamalik*, passim, esp. 107-16 and 117-18; `Udhri, *Tarsi` al-Akhbar*, passim, esp. 93, especially for information concerning the levying of taxes in the *kura* of Elvira during the emirates of al-Hakam I and `Abd al-Rahman II. For the taxes collected from the city of Labla (Niebla), see `Udhri, *Tarsi` al-Akhbar*, 110-11; Ibn Ghalib, *Farha*, passim, esp. 283-84, 291-92, and 294 ff; and Lévi-Provençal, *Instituciones*, 20-21. For more details about the *magharim*, see Ibn `Idhari, *Al-Bayan al-Mughrib*, 1:184, where he asserts that the *magharim* only affected the real estate; and Vallvé, *División*, passim, esp. 264-273 and 320-31.
 23. `Abd Allah al-Ziri, *Mudhakkirat al-Amir `Abd Allah, Akhir Muluk Bani Ziri bi-Gharnata*, ed. Évariste Lévi-Provençal (Cairo: 1955), passim, esp. 125 ff; Reinhart Dozy, *Historia de los Musulmanes de España* (Buenos Aires: 1946), 2:420-23. M`hammad Benaboud, *Al-Ta`rikkh al-Siyasi wa al-Ijtima`i li-Ishbiliya fi `Ahd al-Duwal al-Tawa`if* (Tetuan: 1983), passim, esp. 167-71. Also see my review of Benaboud's book in *Estudios de Asia y Africa* 28, no. 90 (1993): 129-32, esp. 131; and the anonymous *Ta`rikkh al-Khulafa`*, manuscript number 5391 in the Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid. For later periods, in the time of the Muluk al-Tawa`if, several Muslim kingdoms had to pay the *jizyah al-sanawiyah* (also known with the Spanish term of *parias*), which were special tributes to the Christian states, among which the cases of Sevilla and Granada seem to be the better documented.
 24. Lévi-Provençal, *Instituciones*, 23-24; Rachel Arié, *España Musulmana*, in Manuel Tuñón de Lara, *Historia de España* (Barcelona: 1987), 81-84. For more information about the foundation and role of the *sikka* in the time of the first caliph `Abd al-Rahman III, see Abu Marwan ibn Hayyan, *Al-Muqtabis*, ed. Pedro Chalmeta, Federico Corriente, and M. Subh (Madrid: 1979), 5:160-61 (*Crónica del Califa `Abdarrahman III, an-Nasir entre los años 912 y 942*, Sp. trans. María J. Viguera and Federico Corriente [Zaragoza: 1981], 185-86 of the Spanish translation); and *Una Crónica Anónima de `Abd al-Rahman III al-Nasir*, ed. and Sp. trans. Évariste Lévi-Provençal and Emilio García Gómez (Madrid, Granada: 1950), 80 (155-56 of the Spanish translation). Ibn `Idhari, *Al-Bayan al-Mughrib*, vol. 2, passim, esp. 197, who wrote the following lines: *wa fi-ha amara al-Nasiru bi-Iqama Dar al-Sikka Dakhila Madinat Qurtuba, li-Darbi al-Dinanir wa al-Darahim* (In this year, al-Nasir ordered the establishment of the Dar al-Sikka [the Minting Office] inside the city of Córdoba, for the minting of dinars and dirhams.)
 25. The reason why this administrative office had a different name in al-Andalus is still uncertain, even though it has been discussed, following the various Arabic sources that provide some information in this respect.

- Although the *hajib* conducted the *sawa'if* in the time of Hisham II, in the period of the caliphate, for example, the `amirid Almanzor commanded more than 50 *aceifas* against his Christian enemies in the north. Lévi-Provençal, *Instituciones*, 11-12. See also the detailed analysis by Arié, *España Musulmana*, 60-65.
26. Al-Hakam II, `Abd al-Rahman III's successor, also had two *hajibs*: Ja`far al-Saqaliba (Ja`far the Slav) and, after his death, Ja`far al-Mushafi, who was deposed by the powerful Almanzor. Due to the prestige that this position acquired over time (mainly with Almanzor), several rulers during the period of the Ta`ifas, adopted this title rather than *malik* or *sultan*. Lévi-Provençal, *Instituciones*, 12-13; and Arié, *España Musulmana*, 61. After the fall of the Córdoba caliphate, the Muslim territory of al-Andalus was fragmented into numerous small kingdoms. This is the time of the Ta`ifas. The Christians of the peninsula's northern regions took advantage of the Muslims' political difficulties. This was also the time when the Christian Reconquista became organized as an ideology, when the peninsula's Christian kingdoms had the Pope's support and recognition, and when the popes declared the Reconquista of Spain to be just as valid as the Crusades. The French also were directly involved, as well as the Cluny and the Cistercian French religious orders, in fighting the infidels (i.e., the Muslims). See Defourneaux, *Les français en Espagne*, passim, esp. 59-124; Marín-Guzmán, "Crusade in al-Andalus," 289-97; Pierre Vilar, *Historia de España* (Barcelona: 1986), passim, esp. 21-39; Abilio Barbero and Marcelo Vigil, *Sobre los orígenes sociales de la Reconquista* (Barcelona: 1984), passim, esp. 13-98; and Claudio Sánchez Albornoz, *Orígenes y Destino de Navarra. Trayectoria Histórica de Vasconia* (Barcelona: 1983), 11-31.
 27. These offices also had agencies in Madinat al-Zahra' in the time of `Abd al-Rahman III, and in Madinat al-Zahira in the period of the `amirids.
 28. These reforms of the *Katib al-Rasa'il* office were described in detail by the chronicler Ibn `Idhari. The caliph divided this office and appointed four *wuzara'* who had specific and complementary functions. In this way, the office became more efficient. According to Ibn `Idhari, `Abd al-Rahman III appointed the following dignitaries: Jahwar ibn Abi `Abda, who supervised all correspondence coming from the ruler's representatives in the provinces; `Isa ibn Futais, who revised all correspondence coming from the functionaries in the frontiers; `Abd al-Rahman al-Zajjali, who ensured that the caliph's orders and administrative decisions would be properly applied; and Muhammad ibn Hudayr, who also ensured that all decisions were carried out according to the law. See Ibn `Idhari, *Al-Bayan al-Mughrib*, 2:236; and Lévi-Provençal, *Instituciones*, 15.
 29. Lévi-Provençal, *Instituciones*, 16; and Arié, *España Musulmana*, 66.
 30. For more information, see Lévi-Provençal, *Instituciones*, 16; and Arié, *España Musulmana*, passim, esp. 60-69.

31. Lévi-Provençal, *Instituciones*, 16; and Arié, *España Musulmana*, passim, esp. 60-69. For more information about the *barid* system in al-Andalus, see Arié, *España Musulmana*, 69-70; Marín-Guzmán, "Ethnic Groups and Social Classes in Muslim Spain," 37-66; and Marín-Guzmán, "Al-Khassa wa al-`Amma," 483-520.
32. For these institutions, see Lévi-Provençal, *Instituciones*, passim; Arié, *España Musulmana*, passim; Joaquín Vallvé, "El Zalmedina de Córdoba," *Al-Qantara*, vol. 2, fasc. 1-2 (1981): 277-318; Joaquín Vallvé, *El Califato de Córdoba* (Madrid: 1992), passim. For the *Sahib al-Saqiya*, see Thomas Glick, *Irrigation and Society in Medieval Valencia* (Cambridge, MA: 1970), 198-207, esp. 200. For more details concerning these institutions, as well as the social mobility that the various functionaries experienced, see Marín-Guzmán, "Ethnic Groups and Social Classes in Muslim Spain," 37-66; and Marín-Guzmán, "Al-Khassa wa al-`Amma," 483-520. For the *hisba* treatises, see Abu al-Hasan al-Baghdadi ibn Butlan, *Risala f Shira' al-Raqiq wa Taqlid al-`Abid*, ed. `Abd al-Salam Muhammad Harun (Cairo: 1954); Abu Zakariya Yahya ibn `Umar ibn Yusuf ibn `Amir al-Kinani, "Libro de las Ordenanzas del Zoco," Sp. trans. Emilio García Gómez, "Unas Ordenanzas del zoco del siglo IX. Traducción del más antiguo antecedente de los tratados andaluces de hisba, por un autor andaluz," *Al-Andalus* vol. 22, fasc. 2 (1957): 253-316; Abu `Abd Allah Muhammad ibn Abi Muhammad al-Saqati, *Kitab fi Adab al-Hisba* (Libro del buen gobierno del zoco de al-Saqati), Sp. trans. Pedro Chalmeta, *Al-Andalus*, vol. 32, fasc. 1 (1967): 125-62; *Al-Andalus*, vol. 32, fasc. 2 (1967): 359-97; *Al-Andalus*, vol. 33, fasc. 1 (1968): 143-95; *Al-Andalus*, vol. 33, fasc. 2 (1968): 367-434; Thomas Glick, "New Perspectives on the Hisba and Its Hispanic Derivatives," *Al-Qantara* 13, no. 2 (1992): 475-89; Roberto Marín-Guzmán, "Las fuentes árabes para el estudio de la historia social de la España Musulmana. Análisis de un caso: el impacto social de los precios y salarios en al-Andalus," publication forthcoming.
33. See Baladhuri, *Futuh al-Buldan*, Beirut edition, passim, esp. 163-65, 212-20, and 636 (Beirut: 1957); Joaquín Vallvé, "España en el siglo VIII: Ejército y Sociedad," *Al-Andalus*, vol. 43 (1978): 51-112; and Marín-Guzmán, *Popular*, passim, esp. 16. Soldiers in the position of *jund* were granted land properties, which they administered, made productive, and also defended militarily from possible enemies. See Arié, *España Musulmana*, passim, esp. 117-23.
34. Arié, *España Musulmana*, passim, esp. 84-89; Vallvé, *División*, passim; Antonio Arjona Castro, "La Cora de Fahs al-Ballut," *Actas del I Congreso de Historia de Andalucía, December 1976, Andalucía Medieval* (Córdoba: 1978), 77-84; Antonio Arjona Castro, "La Comarca de Priego," *ibid.*, 85-105; Antonio Arjona Castro, "La Cora de Córdoba," 27-44; Antonio Arjona Castro, "La Cora de Sevilla," 47-59; Antonio Arjona Castro, "La Cora de

- Cabra,” 61-75; and Husein Monés, “División politico-administrativa de la España Musulmana,” *Revista del Instituto Egipcio de Estudios Islámicos en Madrid* 4, nos. 1-2 (1957): 79-135.
35. Lévi-Provençal, *Instituciones*, 26; and Arié, *España Musulmana*, passim, esp.84-86.
 36. André Bazzana, Patrice Cressier, and Pierre Guichard, *Châteaux ruraux d'al-Andalus. Histoire et archéologie des husun du sud-est de l'Espagne* (Madrid: 1988), 137 ff.
 37. For more information, see Lévi-Provençal, *Instituciones*, 27 ff.
 38. Lévi-Provençal, *Instituciones*, 27. For more information about the political and territorial divisions of al-Andalus, see Vallvé, *División*, passim.
 39. Lévi-Provençal, *Instituciones*, 31-33; Évariste Lévi-Provençal, “Le rôle de la Marche Supérieur dans l’histoire politique de l’Espagne califienne,” *Pirineos*, nos. 15-16 (Zaragoza: 1950): 35-52; and Arié, *España Musulmana*, passim, esp. 117-19.
 40. The Arabic word *khandaq* is of Persian origin. It seems to have entered Arabic at the time of Prophet Muhammad, when a Persian named Salman suggested that he dig a ditch to defend Madinah against the Makkan’s attacks. This ancient war technique, unknown in the Hijaz until that time, was considered a unique innovation. According to the sources, this ditch was essential for Madinah’s defense and Islam’s survival. Therefore, this battle became known as the Battle of Khandaq (the Ditch). For more information, see Francesco Gabrieli, *Mahoma y las conquistas del Islam* (Madrid: 1967), 113-14; Maxime Rodinson, *Mahoma, el nacimiento del Islam* (Mexico: 1974), 92-93; Carl Brockelmann, *History of the Islamic Peoples* (New York: 1960), 25-26; and Roberto Marín-Guzmán, *El Islam: Ideología e Historia* (San José: 1986), 136-41.
 41. Lévi-Provençal, *Instituciones*, 39. For more details, see Arié, *España Musulmana*, passim, esp.122-32.
 42. Lévi-Provençal, *Instituciones*, 28; Reinhart Dozy, *Recherches sur l’histoire et la littérature de l’Espagne pendant le Moyen Age* (Leiden: 1881), 1:72-83, as well as the documents reproduced in his *Recherches*, 1:iii-ix; Vallvé, *División*, passim, esp. 325; and Arié, *España Musulmana*, passim, esp.123 ff.
 43. For more details about the army, the drafting of people, and the numbers drafted, see Ibn `Idhari, *Al-Bayan al-Mughrib*, 2:111-12; Abu Marwan ibn Hayyan, *Al-Muqtabis*, ed. Mahmud `Ali Makki (Cairo: 1971), vol. 1, passim; Lévi-Provençal, *Instituciones*, 40; and Arié, *España Musulmana*, 123 ff.
 44. Lévi-Provençal, *Instituciones*, 45; J. Oliver Asín, “Origen árabe de rebato, arrobda y sus homónimos,” *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia* (Madrid: 1928), passim; and Leopoldo Torres Balbás, “Rábitas Hispanomusulmanas,” *Al-Andalus*, vol. 13, fasc. 2 (1948): 475-91.
 45. It is important to bear in mind that in the army, as in other levels, there was no social equality. The Arab members of the army, especially those who

- claimed to be *baladiyahun*, enjoyed special privileges. Some of the Arabic sources provide valuable information about the organization and supposed ability of al-Andalus' drafted soldiers. However, some of this information is not totally reliable, since some was written by spies or enemies of the Umayyad rule, such as the geographer and traveler Ibn Hawqal. See Abu al-Qasim al-Nasibi ibn Hawqal, *Kitab Surat al-Ard*, ed. J. H. Kramers (Leiden: 1938), 108-09 and 113; Lévi-Provençal, *Instituciones*, 41; Arié, *España Musulmana*, 123-24; Marín-Guzmán, "Ethnic Groups and Social Classes in Muslim Spain," 37-66; and Marín-Guzmán, "Al-Khassa wa al-'Amma, 483-520.
46. For more details concerning the Saqaliba, see Dozy, *Historia*, vol. 2, passim, esp. 52 ff.; Armand Abel, "Spain: Internal Division" in Gustav von Grunebaum, *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization* (Chicago: 1979), 207-30, esp. 218; Lévi-Provençal, *Instituciones*, 100-01, 106-08, and 115-16; M. al-'Abadi, *Los Eslavos de España* (Madrid: 1953), passim; David Wasserstein, *The Rise and Fall of the Party-Kings: Politics and Society in Islamic Spain: 1002-1086* (Princeton: 1985), passim, esp.73-74; Glick, *Islamic*, 165-78; Angel González Palencia, *Historia de la España Musulmana* (Barcelona: 1925), 54-69; Chejne, *Muslim*, 36, 110-11, and 114-15; and Watt, *Historia*, 66. For a good discussion of the various Arabic sources that deal with the Saqaliba, as well as the contributions of the major secondary works about this term's origins, development, and uses, see David Ayalon, *Outsiders in the Lands of Islam: Mamluks, Mongols and Eunuchs* (London: 1988), 92-101. Ibn Hawqal, *Kitab Surat al-Ard*, 108-17, is one of the major Arabic sources for the study of the various Saqaliba ethnic groups besides the Bulgarians and the peoples settled on the Black Sea's coastal regions. Ibn Hawqal asserted that in al-Andalus, the Franks (people from Galicia, Lombardia and Calabria) also were considered to be Saqaliba. However, he pointed out that they were ethnically different. In his descriptions and his maps, he drew the line of separation between the Saqaliba, meaning the Slavs, and those peoples from other places in Europe brought to Spain as slaves.
 47. *Akhbar Majmu'a*, 109 (101 of the Spanish translation); Lévi-Provençal, *Instituciones*, 42; Arié, *España Musulmana*, 123-24, where she provides important references concerning the creation of a permanent army of mercenaries in al-Andalus for the first time under *amir* al-Hakam I.
 48. *Akhbar Majmu'a*, 129 (116-17 of the Spanish translation); Lévi-Provençal, *Instituciones*, 42; and Arié, *España Musulmana*, 124. According to the anonymous *Akhbar Majmu'a*, the personal army for *amir* al-Hakam I was called *'irafa*.
 49. See: *Akhbar Majmu'a*, 129 (116-17 of the Spanish translation). The Saqaliba became a strong army at the time of caliph 'Abd al-Rahman III al-Nasir, who established his personal militia of enslaved soldiers; Lévi-Provençal, *Instituciones*, 42; and Arié, *España Musulmana*, 124.

50. `Abd al-Rahman ibn Khaldun, *Al-Muqaddima*, ed. Wafi `Ali `Abd al-Wahid (Cairo: 1965), 92-93 and 101 ff.; Marín-Guzmán, *El Islam: Ideología e Historia*, 252-53; Roberto Marín-Guzmán, "Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) y el Método Científico de la Historia," *Cuadernos de Historia*, no. 43 (Universidad de Costa Rica: 1982), passim.
51. To all of these variations is the added complexity of the existence of other mercenary soldiers: the Berbers brought to the Iberian Peninsula by the `Amirid Almanzor (981-1002) to form his own personal militia. The presence of these soldiers constituted a major reform in the organization of al-Andalus' army, despite the fact that they were used earlier by al-Hakam II (961-976) as his personal militia. Sometimes, these new Berbers were complete tribes under the direction of their own leaders. Very soon, they came into conflict with the old ones, those who had arrived at the time of the conquest. This major reform of the `Amirid Almanzor intended to stop the Arab military aristocracy and the Saqaliba's pride by introducing the Berber mercenaries as a new alternative for his personal army. For more information, see `Abd Allah al-Ziri, *Mudhakkirat*, passim; Lévi-Provençal, *Instituciones*, 44; and Arié, *España Musulmana*, 124-25.
52. It is still impossible, at this point, to know these details. All that one can do is speculate or, as modern historians have done, rely on later sources, such as the treatise *Tuhfat al-Anfus wa Shi`ar Ahl al-Andalus*, written by `Ali Ibn `Abd al-Rahman ibn Hudhayl in the Nazri Granada in the fourteenth century, or even on the more concise eleventh-century work written by Abu Bakr al-Turtushi, his famous *Siraj al-Muluk*. There is no doubt of the importance and the detailed descriptions contained in the *Tuhfat al-Anfus wa Shi`ar Ahl al-Andalus* of the dimensions of the jihad in al-Andalus, the organization of the army, and the way orders were passed from the top to the foot soldiers. However, these accounts are not totally applicable for earlier periods. We do not know for sure if these were the same practices in the times of the emirate and the caliphate, for the separations in time could have brought a difference to the armies' organization. For more information, see Lévi-Provençal, *Instituciones*, passim, esp. 142-43; Abu Bakr al-Turtushi, *Siraj al-Muluk*, *Lámpara de Príncipes*, Sp. trans. M. Alarcón (Madrid: 1930-31), passim, esp. 2:332.
53. For more information, see Arié, *España*, 122.
54. Abu Marwan ibn Hayyan, *Kitab al-Muqtabis fi Akhbar Rijal al-Andalus*, ed. Melchor Martínez Antuña, *Chronique du Règne du Calife Umayyade `Abd Allah à Cordoue* (Paris: 1937), vol. 3, passim, esp. 93, 97, and 100-01; and Lévi-Provençal, *España Musulmana*, 237.
55. Arabic sources describe in detail the major battles that took place at the time of the Prophet. From the descriptions of `Ali's actions during the Battle of Uhud, one can believe that the military leadership stayed on a hill since that early age of the Muslim state, in this case Mount Uhud. Al-Mufid, for exam-

ple, affirms that `Ali protected Prophet Muhammad on that hill, which could lead us to believe that the command and orders were then given from the top of the mountain, which also seems reasonable. From there, the commander could have had a better view of the war and sent orders to his soldiers. However, we still do not know how the orders reached the battlefield. This is one important example of the war techniques since that early age of Islam. For more details, see Shaykh Mufid, *Kitab al-Irshad: The Book of Guidance into the Lives of the Twelve Imams*, Eng. trans. I. K. A. Howard (New York: 1981), 52-61, esp. 63. Other Arabic sources also contain important details in the same respect. For more details, see Roberto Marín-Guzmán, *El Islam: Ideología e Historia*, 77 and 135-62; and Roberto Marín-Guzmán, "Las causas de la expansión islámica y los fundamentos del Imperio Musulmán," *Revista Estudios*, no. 5 (1984): 39-67.